Public Input Black Hawk Corridor Passenger Rail HandoutLightwieght, self-propelled rail cars (DMUs) like this
Rochelle -built model, can provide tow cost commute
service to Rockford.
The Blac
Phase 2
Dubuque, IA
• Galena
Historic Galena
An easy day trip to one
of Illinois' most beloved
tourist destinations.
A Reinvigorated
Downtown
Transit oriented
developments are
being designed around
planned tr S; i
ha
Freeport
Affordable
Commuter Service
F. -la: I enables
3
cost-efficient commuter
Erle between RocLiord
u 1 01 N
suburbs,
New Development
i:,tel is being q built
adj3;ei-t:Rockford'
itaticyl.
Co
Phase 1
ido
Existing
00
Huntley
0
A Better Metra
phase I includes 11" Irc
rvietra bridge, Impro I 1
area C0m''`xes.
Streamlined Rad Operations
The C4 of Elgin }!I
date the LI? and M::
creating more open space Tor
dovelopment.
Moving the Biac Cl awk Corridor Forward
e
Station, 0
dwide Connections
Future servicetoO'Hare
Airport will connect NW
Illinois to 155 domestic
acid 58 intemational.nooi
stop destinations
The Blackhawk Corridor is home to important manufacturing and tourist attractions that would
highly benefit from being connected by train service. Previously Illinois allocated $223 r inion in
funding for Phase I of the project, which was scheduled to begin this year. Governor Rauner has
since put this project on hold. It is critical that Governor Rauner move forward with this project
which would facilitate much needed commuter rail service, O'Hare Airport connections and real
estate developments.
Already -funded rack
set the stage for:
1. Ccmlmuter Rail
2. O'Hare Airport Connections
3. Real Estate Developments
What You Can Do
Tell Governor Rauner to move
forward with this project and
why it is important to you at
JustBuildit.org/Blackhawk.
p
veer eats
Midwest High Speed Rail Association
REINVENTING TRAVEL. REINVENTING Ti -1 MIG10EST.
4165 N Lincoln Ave. Ch€caao; IL 50625
773.3.34.E758 I J !stB i ldltorg
LEFT AT THE STATION?
Return of passenger rail to northwest Illinois, Chicago to Dubuque, will contribute to rural economic development,
a rebirth. As a result of reinstatement of the Blackhawk, Bring Back the Blackhawk, our community will experience
increases in local job growth, generation of small business activity, conservation of resources, and a dramatic
decrease in traffic congestion and serious accidents on
Illinois Route 20.
Por. , APPLE ILLINOIS CEN1RAII
505Rp IELEE
TRAIN DEPOT :iota
1899 1993
Join us, support efforts of a bi-state citizens initiative,
Illinois and Iowa, to return passenger rail, Chicago
to Dubuque, Bring Back the Blackhawk; go online,
complete the survey @ http://www.surveymonkey.
com/r/RY2WZHC and sign the petition @ https://
petitions.moveon.org/signIbring-back-the-blackhawk.
If you want to get involved, join us and collect
signatures for Jo Daviess , Stephenson, Winnebago,
and Boone County non-binding referenda to be
placed on the November 6, 2018 ballot; to share your
comments, leave a message @ http://ridetherai/.org.
—.,010061
..e.eeeeYi,
j ,,y.....eeeN�tr_,
.Ile f eeilltiWl ....eeee•••,:.
..,....es'NWMN
--v.INISN
SIEMENS
Gerald Podraza
Illinois Chairperson
Bring Back the Blackhawk
Train B - Local
7 Days per Week
READ DOWN
(West Bound)
READ UP
(East Bound)
Chicago -Union
Station
5:45 AM
9:15 PM - ?
*OHARE Airport
(shuttle -
Bensenville)
Elgin
Marengo
Rockford
*Seward
Freeport
*Lena
*Warren
*Apple River
*Scales Mound
Galena
9:15 AM - ?
5:45 PM
*East Dubuque
Dubuque
*Dyersville
Cedar Falls
*denotes flag stop
Amtrak - The Blackhawk
Train A - Express
7 days per week
READ DOWN
(West Bound)
READ UP
(East Bound)
Chicago
Station
- Union
5:45 PM
9:15 AM
*OHARE Airport
(shuttle -
Bensenville)
Elgin
Rockford
Freeport
*Lena
*Apple River
Galena
9:15 PM
5:45 AM
Dubuque
Cedar Falls
* denotes flag stop
What does it cost to have Amtrak service in Quincy? - Herald -Whig - http://www.whig.com/20171114/what-does-it-cost-to-have-amtrak-...
HEA ALI) WHI
What does it cost to have Amtrak service
in Quincy?
A conductor helps passengers disembark from Amtrak's Carl Sandburg train in this 2015 file photo. The Illinois
Department of Transportation provided an $11.6 million subsidy for the rail service between Quincy and Chicago. j H -W
File Photo/Phil Carlson
Phil Carlson
By Matt Hopf Herald -Whig
Posted: Nov. 14, 2017 9:05 am
We hear about what it costs in government subsidies to have passenger air service
in Quincy, but what does it cost to have Amtrak in Quincy?
It costs $17.2 million a year to operate the Chicago Zephyr and Carl Sandburg trains between
Quincy and Chicago.
Kelsea Gurski, a spokesman for the Illinois Department of Transportation, said that in fiscal
2017, $11.6 million was provided through the department. The remaining $5.6 million was
captured through ticket sales and other revenue.
1 of 2 2/6/18 9:54 AM
What does it cost to have Amtrak service in Quincy? - Herald -Whig - http://www.whig.com/20171114/what-does-it-cost-to-have-amtrak-...
The overall federal operation subsidy for Amtrak, according to the U.S. Department of
Transportation, was $1.385 billion for fiscal 2016, which includes money for capital projects. An
Amtrak financial report says $288.5 million was for operations.
In the recently approved Illinois budget, the state allocated $52 million for passenger rail
operating assistance. This includes the two trains for Quincy Amtrak service, the Lincoln Service
between Chicago and St. Louis, and the Illini and Saluki trains between Chicago and Carbondale.
The three services served more than 1.01 million passengers in Amtrak's fiscal 2016, a drop of
about 64,000 from in fiscal 2015. That year, the two lines that serve Quincy carried 202,407
passengers.
The Illinois subsidy also goes toward the Hiawatha Service between Chicago and Milwaukee,
which is a shared cost between IDOT and the Wisconsin Department of Transportation.
For air service to Quincy Regional Airport, the U.S. Department of Transportation awarded a
two-year contract in August to SkyWest for 12 weekly nonstop round trips to O'Hare
International Airport in Chicago at an annual subsidy of $2.659 million through the Essential
Air Service program. Flights will start Dec. 1.
Cape Air, which has offered 36 weekly flights to St. Louis Lambert International Airport since
2009, had a two-year contract through the EAS program that cost $2.532 million in the first year
and $2.633 million in the second year.
How can my question be answered? Just ask. We'll quiz community leaders,
business officials, historians, educators -- whoever can tell us what you want to
know. Submit questions to answers@whig.com or mail them to Answers, The
Herald -Whig, P.O. Box 909, Quincy, IL 62306. Provide a name and phone number
so we can respond or clarify information. Questions dealing with personal or legal
disputes will not be accepted.
2 o 2 2/6/189:54 AM
Life and death
of the lack Hawk
By Jim Clark, Pete McClanathan and Mike Schafer
It can be said that the Black Hawk never had a chance from the start.
The Chicago -Dubuque 403(b) run (Amtrak 370, 371, and 372)
was a classic example of the rule that if something can't be done right,
it shouldn't be done at all. While there may have been no malice on
the part of the three operating parties (Illinois DOT, ICG, and Amtrak),
each did contribute to its demise. Like an unwanted stepchild, the
Black Hawk was plagued with unreliable equipment, erratic timekeep-
ing, and an absence of marketing throughout its history, and
eventually fell victim to budgetary constraints within the Illinois De-
partment of Transportation. The train was terminated by order of Gov.
James R. Thompson, but not before a six-month campaign orches-
trated by local citizens had taken the case for the train all the way to the
governor's office and had come within an eyelash of persuading
'Thompson to reverse his decision.
With a heritage rooted in Illinois Central's streamliner Land 0' Corn
(discontinued in 1967) and the all-purpose Hawkeye (which survived
until Amtrak Day, 1971), the Black Hawk began operation in 1974
serving the Illinois communities of Elmhurst, Rockford, Freeport, War-
ren, Galena. and East Dubuque on its daily 182 -mile run. The train
was in part the brainchild of Scott Rogers, a Freeport native. Almost
single-handedly, the -then teenager convinced legislators of the need
for passenger service to northwestern Illinois. Funding for the train was
provided by an amendment to the IDOT appropriation bill, signed
somewhat reluctantly by then -Gov. Dan Walker in the summer of
1973. Repeated snarls of bureaucratic red tape delayed the train's
start-up until Valentine's Day, 1974, when a camel was born—the
Black Hawk.
A camel, you will recall, is a horse designed by a committee. If
private business had conceived a Chicago -Dubuque passenger train
with honest intentions of making it work, we'd probably still have a
Black Hawk today—and a successful one at that. But mandate two
government agencies and a railroad to provide such a service, and
you've got troubles. The Black Hawk operation was tailored to mesh
the operating quirks of the railroad with the whimsies of what IDOT
thought people wanted in the way of train service. Apparently no one
ever considered asking the people of Elmhurst, Rockford, Freeport,
Galena and Dubuque—maybe even Chicago—what they wanted in
way of train service. Throw in Amtrak's indifference to the whole affair
(Amtrak wouldn't even allow IDOT to advertise the train) and you can
see where things were headed.
IDOT was not the only villain, nor were its failures prompted by poor
intentions. Its people had earnest goals of making the train work, but
they were overburdened with other projects and pitifully underfunded
to do the job right A common theme at 1DOT is to blame the public
when a train isn't working out. When Black Hawk patronage failed to
meet expectations, IDOT several times hinted at discontinuance when
its attitude should have been, "what are we doing wrong and where
can we make improvements?"
What was wrong with the Black Hawk's operation? Start with sched-
uling. For businessmen needing to spend a weekday in Chicago, the
train was a flop. It arrived in Chicago too late (10:15 a.m.) for most
business appointments, and left too late (initially at 6:20 p.m., then at
5:45 p.m.) to bring them home comfortably. Meanwhile, Galena made
a case fer a weekend train that returned to Chicago in the evening. The
mayor and Chamber of Commerce of Galena often voiced a need for
restructured service that better served the booming tourist, recrea-
tional, and second -home market of northwestern Illinois, but nobody
at IDOT or Amtrak seemed to listen until it was too late.
Running time was another factor that worked against the train, par -
James C. Clark is a writer who hues in Galena, M. Peter McClanathan is a Freeport WO
attorney. Mike Schafer is the art director of this magazine and grew up in Rockford.
36
An SDP4O has a dome and conventioncoaches in tow as it arrives i
'"11111111111;111111111;;;;;;g2:21:3111g2lIteelit:22123:111:42311111.1NIIlltiltig1413111111151112215
ticularly for Chicago -Rockford service—the most competitive segment
of the Black Hawk's run. The Rockford press was usually kind to the
Black Hawk, but quick to point out at the beginning in 1974 that a
Rockford -Chicago running time of 2 hours, 15 minutes was not partic-
ularly attractive. Although improved track conditions in the Chicago
Terminal District resulted in a 20 -minute tightening in 1975, the one
hour -55 minute schedule over the 85 -mile trip still was some 20 min-
utes slower than in Illinois Central days, and could not compete with
nearby 1-90.
Consistently poor timekeeping was the most obvious of the Black
Hawk's ills. It is more than coincidence that a drop in ridership begin-
ning in the summer of 1980 came at a time of horrendous on-time
performance, punctuated by a zero percent on-time record in October,
1980. Fingers often conveniently pointed at ICG when the Black
Hawk was tardy. But even with the most skilled dispatchers the Iowa
Division can be an intricate stretch of railroad to operate, with its single
track, its aging ABS signal system, and its many curves and grades. On
numerous occasions the Black Hawk had to limp along at 15 mph in
the face of false red block signals.
Equipment was another problem, probably more so than the quirks
of the Chicago -Dubuque line. The RDC's that first protected the serv-
ice were mechanical disasters. Once they had been pulled, the Black
Hawk became the repository for virtually every type of equipment
Amtrak owned save for Metroliners and Turboliners. As fascinating as ,
those domes and observation cars were to fans, they meant little to
regular travelers who had to put up with their operating (or non.
operating) quirks. The arrival of Amfleet in August 1977 brought a
degree of reliability which produced large gains in ridership.
' • "
Even with Amfleet in place, howeverequipment problems con
iinued and became a sore subject among the crew of the Black Hawk,'
,
Conductors and trainrnen tell of repeatedly reporting malfunctions to,
Amtrak upon arrival in Chicago, only to find the same car with tlki
same problems in the evening consist. Engineers bemoaned the fre-‘t
quent assignment of P30 power to the train. Designed for heavy-dut
Northeast Corridor work, the P30's did not accelerate or corner W
on ICG's hilly, circuitous Iowa Division, and they have a very
record of mechanical breakdown. Yet they consistently showed up
the Black Hawk and contributed to its poor on-time performanek
Crew members also questioned the need for many of the slow orders'
PASSENGER 1I N JOL AL .4
Mike Schafer
M Galena, Ill., in July 1975 atter crossing the Galeria River.
ns
11111111111111141111101111111111111112110011m
Dubuque, separated from the east by twisting, dangerous U.S. 20
arid having minimal air and bus service, consistently boasted the high-
est ridership figures for the Black Hawk (an ironic note considering
Iowa has no 403(b) program and contributed no money to Black
Hawk coffers). It was no surprise to Amtrak watchers who know well
that trains tend to do better at smaller cities, particularly those without
alternative forms of transportation. But although Dubuque and nearby
Iowa cities provided slightly under 50% of the train's ridership, these
passengers paid a fare that was lower per mile than passengers out of
Rockford or Freeport, where the train competed with much better
highways and bus service, Neither Amtrak nor IDOT ever exploited
this natural source of increased revenue by restructuring fares. Nor did
IDOT attempt to coordinate a two -state effort to extend the service to
its natural terminus of Waterloo. Iowa, or at a minimum to solicit
financial support from the State of Iowa.
One of the Black Hawk's consistent weaknesses was low ridership
out of Rockford, a city blessed with hourly Greyhound departures to
Chicago and a well-maintained tollway. Nonetheless, had IDOT made
a study of the Rockford market it would have discovered that most
residents live on the booming east side of the city. But to board the
train, an east -side resident had to make a 15 or 20 -minute drive west
to the Amtrak depot in a decaying section of downtown Rockford. The
Rockford solution was obvious and simple: build a small East Rockford
station. None ever was built.
For all of its troubles, the Black Hawk performed well enough to
justify its existence during its early years. Although ridership was slug-
gish, it seemed as if IDOT had committed itself to providing a rail
transportation service to highway -poor northwestern Illinois, and was
prepared to weather the storms. The train carried 30,156 passengers
in fiscal 1975 (Illinois operates on a July 1 fiscal year), and 1976 was
only slightly better at 32,004. The state's subsidy in fiscal 1976 was
$621,900, a figure worth rioting because by 1981 the same level of
subsidy was considered unacceptable.
Ridership began to grow rapidly after 1976, probably due to the
stability of regular Amfleet equipment and the fact that people now
were becoming acquainted with the service. The train carried 37,281
passengers in fiscal 1977, and 43,975 in 1978. Ridership peaked in
1979 at 54,419 and held steady in 1980 at 52,380. The state's sub-
sidy, meanwhile, dropped from $621,900 in fiscal 1976 to $339,000
JANUARY 1982
in 1979. Increased costs boosted the subsidy to $534,847 in 1980 but
the steady ridership neutralized thoughts of dropping the service in
1980, an election year.
Beginning in the summer of 1980 two processes combined to un-
dercut the Black Hawk. Horrendous on-time performance charac-
terized the service through the fall and winter of 1980-'81. Passengers
will forgive five or 10 minutes, but the train began to arrive 30 to 60
minutes late consistently, and the public quickly leamed that it could
not rely on the train. Meanwhile, a major tour operator out of Rock-
ford became frustrated with a perceived lack of cooperation by Amtrak
and ICG, and removed his tours from the train in the summer of 1980.
Ridership on the Black Hawk plumetted to 40.163 in fiscal 1981 as
the state subsidy grew to $657,000.
The timing could not have been worse. Ronald Reagan had just
been elected on a conservative platform, and his January 1981 budget
message foretold sharp cuts in government services. Illinois politicians,
forced to deal with reduced federal dollars and eager to jump on the
bandwagon of fiscal responsibility, scrambled for areas to trim from
state programs. IDOT responded in late February by arbitrarily reduc-
ing the state's proposed 1982 rail passenger budget from $3 million to
$2.5 million. and recommended the Black Hawk to bear the loss
based on its status as the worst performer of the state's four regular
403(b) trains. (The Prairie Marksman, a much worse performer, was
not targeted at that time because of its experimental classification).
Although ridership was higher and the state subsidy no greater than in
the train's early years, the economic and political climate of 1981
called for different conclusions, and IDOT seized the opportunity to
wash its hands of the train. When Thompson delivered his proposed
1982 budget on March 3, 1981, the Black Hawk was not included.
Though dismissed by the state's policy makers in March, the Black
Hawk suddenly found friends on the local level who would not accept
its loss without a struggle. The fight to save the Black Hawk was long,
involved, and extraordinary in many ways. Led by authors Clark and
McClanathan, it was very much a grass-roots effort involving a broad
spectrum of citizens and public officials, as well as NARP arid Illinois
ARP members. The battle was lost, but it was a close one—it went
down to the last day.
One would have expected the state legislators from the areas served
by the Black Hawk to rally to its defense. Not so. Initial contacts in
early March found a mixture of ignorance, indifference, and even
hostility. The senior Republican state representative from the Freeport -
Galena area, who probably was in a position politically to do the most
good, took an adverse position from the start, pointing to the large
"subsidy" that the train was costing the state. Most of the other legisla-
tors paid the expected lip service of "1 support the train", but did no
more than go through the proper motions and say the right things.
There was the usual inter -party sniping. Very little meaningful progress
carne out of this political gamesmanship.
With tenuous political backing, the Black Hawk's supporters realized
their task was multi-level, first to educate the public to carry the mes-
sage to the lawmakers that the train indeed was an important issue,
then to keep on top of the political scene in Springfield as legislation
developed. With the help of Scott Rogers (now a college graduate
returned to Freeport). Clark and McClanathan solicited resolutions of
support from city councils, mayors, and Chambers of Commerce
along the route. All were forwarded to legislators and the governor's
office. Excellent coverage from news media in Freeport, Rockford, and
Dubuque increased awareness of the issue. To present the most unified
voice possible, the group decided to create an official name, and so it
was that on the night of April 23, 1981 at Benjamin's Tavern in Galena,
Black Hawk Area Rail Passenger Organization (BHARPO) was bom,
later to become incorporated as an Illinois not-for-profit corporation.
Stationery and envelopes were printed for the campaign.
It was recognized early that since the Govemor's proposed legisla-
tion contained no appropriation for the Black Hawk, funding would
have to be added by amendment After meeting with BHARPO per-
sons, the junior Republican state representative from the Freeport -
Galena area introduced such an amendment in the House Appropria-
tions Committee late in April. It would have divided the $2.5 million
rail budget among all five 403(b) trains, including the Black Hawk.
Unfortunately, the amendment died in a political hassle over the entire
IDOT budget in early June.
Meanwhile, BHARPO seemed to find a friend in the local state -4
37
senator, a Democrat. Although young, he had established a record of
success in sponsoring legislation, and several political confrontations
with Thompson had left him with a sense of how best to play the
game. In June, working on information supplied by BHARPO, the
senator sponsored an amendment in ..the state senate which divided
the $2.5 million to allocate $460,900 to the Black Hawk. This amend-
ment emerged in the final legislation passed on June 30, 1981. But it
turned out the battle was only beginning.
iDOT immediately reaffirmed its opposition to the Black Hawk,
proclaiming first that the $460,900 was insufficient to operate the train
for a year (correct but misleading) and foremost that the money was
needed to operate the state's other, more "successful" trains. At the
instance of BHARPO, a delegation of citizens and public officials met
in Chicago on July 13 with Secretary of Transportation John Kramer
and his passenger program manager, Fred Wengenroth. As a follow-up
BHARPO submitted a nine -page summary of recommendations for
improved operation. However, it became obvious from the tone of the
meeting that the decision would not be changed at that time. On July
21, Thompson signed the IDOT appropriation but on the same date
IDOT, acting in concert with the governor, announced the Brack Hawk
would be dropped Sept. 30. Formal request was sent to Amtrak on
July 22 by Wengenroth. IDOT's plan was to ask the legislature in its
October session to reallocate the Black Hawk appropriation to the
other trains,
At that point, the situation looked bleak. However, it was felt that the
Black Hawk might yet be saved if Thompson could be persuaded that
the train could be made to work. Soon thereafter an expanded cam-
paign to save the train was launched with a view toward meeting with
the governor to present the case directly. It was a three -pronged
effort—to rally public support for the Black Hawk, to gain media
attention and backing, and to bring political pressure to bear on IDOT
and the governor to retain funding for the train.
Throughout August and September, Black Hawk crew personnel,
Illinois ARP members, and citizen volunteers put 6,000 fliers into the
hands of passengers and supporters. One-half of each flier contained a
message explaining the plight of the Black Hawk and the other half
consisted of a pre -addressed mailer on which people could write their
own messages of support for the train. The fliers were collected by
crew members and BHARPO workers, who tallied them and sent them
to the governor's office. More than 2,300 mailers were forwarded to
Thompson by BHARPO, and several hundred more were sent in by
people on their own.
Public support also came through the efforts of other groups and
individuals. The Chambers of Commerce in Galena and Dubuque
publicized the Black Hawk crisis, called for letters and telegrams, and
gathered signatures on petitions. Sundown Ski Resort and Loras Col-
lege in Dubuque became involved. Many individuals wrote or called
the governor's office and encouraged friends, neighbors and co-work-
ers to express their support. A widespread, informal network of Black
Hawk supporters came into being, helping to create a very high level
of public awareness of the train's plight.
Public awareness also was helped by excellent coverage from radio.
TV and newspapers in Northern Illinois and Eastern Iowa. A media list
was developed by BHARPO and press releases were sent out on a
regular basis. Clark and McClanathan gave several dozen interviews to
the press and made a number of radio and TV appearances on news
shows, news specials, and talk shows. Eventually, national media at-
tention came to the Black Hawk as the story was picked up by the wire
services. A Philadelphia Inquirer reporter rode the train and prepared
a feature. Syndicated columnist Nick Thimmesch visited Galena and
his column about the Black Hawk was distributed nationwide.
An important technique for gaining press support was personal con-
tact, For example, Clark and McClanathan, along with Galena Mayor
Einsweiler and Black Hawk conductor Joe Kemp. paid a call on the
editorial director of the Rockford Register -Star, who had been inclined
to oppose funding for the Black Hawk because of the state's financial
condition. A couple of weeks tater, he editorialized in favor of retaining
the train. Personal contact also was extremely important in gaining
political support for the train. BHARPO kept in close touch with may-
ors, public officials, and legislators along the route. Excellent coopera-
tion also came from U.S. Rep. Lynn Martin's Washington office.
As of early September, no response had come from Thompson's
office. For a final push. BHARPO called a meeting of all legislators and
33
mayors from the 34th (Rockford) and 35th (Freeport/Galena) districts.
The lawmakers agreed to request a meeting with the governor. and on
Sept. 16, word came that Thompson would meet with the group.
The meeting with Thompson took place in Chicago on Sept. 25,
Chaired by McClanathan, the session lasted 50 minutes. There were
24 citizens and public officials in attendance, along with reporters from
Rockford and Freeport radio and TV stations. Seventeen people took
turns elaborating the Black Hawk's problems, suggesting ways in
which the service could be improved, and expressing support for the
train. At the heart of the presentation was a list of 15 specific sugges-
tions, developed by BHARPO, as to how the Black Hawk could be
made successful. Thompson listened intently, asked some quite per-
ceptive questions, and said he would take the matter under considera-
tion. Though he made no promises, the governor gave the impression
that the issue was by no means settled.
The governor made his decision late in the afternoon of Tuesday,
Sept. 29, and there would be no celebration. Thompson cited the
state's financial problems, the train's low ridership and revenues, and
doubts that the suggested changes and improvements would prove to
be adequate. Some cynics suggested that Thompson's meeting with
Black Hawk supporters was strictly for show, that the issue had already
been decided. But sources close to the governor's office dispute that.
Though money most often has been cited as the reason for discon-
tinuing the Black Hawk, the politics also played an unknown but
important role. As a candid bureaucrat noted, "it's no trouble at all to
find a few hundred thousand dollars in Springfield." But money won't
be found unless there are political reasons to do so, and northwestern
Illinois has been short of political clout for decades. Also, politicians in
that corner of the state tend to be rather independent. More than one
observer pointed out that Thompson received little support for his
statewide transportation package from members of his own party in
northwestern lllinois. And although the areas' legislators were polite
and outwardly helpful, none seemed determined to carry the case for
the train into the political arena where BHARPO and citizen supporters
could neither watch nor participate. In the final days the Black Hawk's
supporters could do no more than stand by and wait for the process of
political give-and-take to unfold.
A light rain fell and fog hung on the ridges as the Black Hawk
traveled across northern Illinois on the night of Sept. 30, paying a final
visit to the communities which had become fond of the little train. A
bright Heritage Fleet coach led an Amcafe and an Amcoach behind
F40 #261. True to form. the Black Hawk was switched onto Buckbee
Siding east of Rockford for an eastbound ICG freight. A violent thun-
derstorm tore off tree limbs and caused power outages in Freeport
early in the evening, but cleared in time for some 40 people to come to
the station and bid farewell. West of Freeport signal problems further
delayed the train, but this time no one on board minded. No. 371
pulled into the Dubuque station at 10:30 PM., thirty-five minutes late.
After unloading, the train moved down to the ICG yard while the
locomotive was turned, and soon the F40 and its three -car consist
were back in front of the station. The inside of the beautiful Heritage
Fleet coach, which a few hours earlier had witnessed the festivity of a
farewell gathering, now was laden with cables and other equipment
from the makeshift Dubuque service facility. They wasted no time
dismantling the operation, and the sight was depressing. The crew
loaded several boxes of materials from the Amtrak ticket office, then
boarded. Conductor Russ Houy gave the "highball", and at 11:25
P.M. the train slipped out into the mist, deadheading back to Chicago.
The extra made an unscheduled stop at Galena to discharge Rogers
and McClanathan, on board as unofficial guests of the crew. As the
rear markers of the Amcoach disappeared around a curve beyond the
station, the midnight silence brought down the reality of what had
happened. Across the small Galena River, floodlights bathed the many
historical buildings just as they had during the past many months while
hope abounded for the train's future, a stark contrast to the chilly
stillness of the October night. It was hard to realize that it was over.
The Black Hawk was a train about which many cared deeply. Its loss
will be felt for a long time to come. But at Benjamin's Tavern in the
early morning hours of Oct 1, the three leaders of BHARPO found
themselves looking to the future with ambition and optimism. No one
will predict when or in what form rail passenger service will return to
northwestern Illinois. but valuable lessons were learned and the issue
will not be allowed to die.
PASSENGER r JOURNAL