Local & Regional Government Alliance on Race & Equity - Request to Join Copyright 2014
City of Dubuque Action Items # 2.
ITEM TITLE: Local & Regional Government Alliance on Race & Equity - Request to Join
Amicus Curiae Brief
SUMMARY: City Manager recommending approval for the City of Dubuque to sign an
amicus curiae brief in a case called Inclusive Communities Project v.
Texas Department of Housing and Community Development that is
pending before the United States Supreme Court.
SUGGESTED DISPOSITION: Suggested Disposition: Receive and File; Approve
ATTACHMENTS:
Description Type
❑ Request to Joint Amicus Curiae Brief-MVM Memo City Manager Memo
❑ Local and Regional Government Alliance Request to Sign Amicus Brief Staff Memo
❑ Mt. Holly Amicus Brief Supporting Documentation
❑ Draft Inclusive Communities Brief Supporting Documentation
THE CITY OF Dubuque
UBE I
erica .i
Masterpiece on the Mississippi 2007-2012-2013
TO: The Honorable Mayor and City Council Members
FROM: Michael C. Van Milligen, City Manager
SUBJECT: Local & Regional Government Alliance on Race & Equity - Request to Join
Amicus Curiae Brief
DATE: December 9, 2014
On October 6, 2014, the City Council approved the City of Dubuque joining the Local
and Regional Government Alliance on Race and Equity. The Alliance is a national
network of local governments that are addressing structural equity for all, with racial
equity as the lead issue.
During our November 12, 2014 Steering Committee Meeting, members of the Alliance
were asked to consider joining in an amicus curiae brief (amicus brief) in a case
pending before the United States Supreme Court called Inclusive Communities Project
v. Texas Department of Housing and Community Development. The Supreme Court
accepts amicus briefs as a way to ensure that interests beyond those of the two parties
involved in a case are taken into consideration when there is a potential for the decision
on the issue at hand to have far reaching legal effects.
Inclusive Communities is a case with potentially far reaching legal effects, as it will
address the question of whether the Fair Housing Act prohibits policies and practices
that have an unjustified discriminatory impact (as contrasted with policies and practices
that are intentionally discriminatory). This legal standard is at the heart of the Fair
Housing Act, has been approved by all circuit courts of appeals that have addressed the
issue, and is part of many of the most important landmark housing cases over the past
40 years. Amicus briefs are being submitted from a range of key players, one of which
is local governments. The Alliance was approached because the governments who
have joined the Alliance are committed to equity, including supporting the Fair Housing
Act which was designed to remedy the current effects of past discrimination.
The case is the third in a series of cases that has gone to the United States Supreme
Court centered on the issue of whether or not the Fair Housing Act includes
discriminatory impact. The prior two cases settled before a Supreme Court decision
was reached.
Human Rights Director Kelly Larson recommends City Council approval for the City of
Dubuque to sign an amicus curiae brief in a case called Inclusive Communities Project
v. Texas Department of Housing and Community Development that is pending before
the United States Supreme Court. I have discussed this with City Attorney Barry
Lindahl and Assistant City Attorney Crenna Brumwell, and they believe a previous brief
was written by the attorney in this case and have no objection to this recommendation.
I concur with the recommendation and respectfully request Mayor and City Council
approval.
114.14 ..
Mic ael C. Van Milligen'—� s
MCVM:jh
Attachment
cc: Barry Lindahl, City Attorney
Cindy Steinhauser, Assistant City Manager
Teri Goodmann, Assistant City Manager
Kelly Larosn, Human Rights Director
2
THE CITY OF Dubuque
AII11-America CiI.ty
UB E1
Masterpiece on the Mississippi 2007.2012.2013
TO: Michael C. Van Milligen, City Manager
FROM: Kelly Larson, Human Rights Director
DATE: December 9, 2014
RE: Local & Regional Government Alliance on Race & Equity — Request to
Join Amicus Curiae Brief
The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that the City of Dubuque sign an
amicus curiae brief in a case called Inclusive Communities Project v. Texas Department
of Housing and Community Development that is pending before the United States
Supreme Court.
Background
On October 6, 2014, the City Council approved the City of Dubuque joining the Local
and Regional Government Alliance on Race and Equity. The Alliance is a national
network of local governments that are addressing structural equity for all, with racial
equity as the lead issue.
During our November 12, 2014 Steering Committee Meeting, members of the Alliance
were asked to consider joining in an amicus curiae brief (amicus brief) in a case
pending before the United States Supreme Court called Inclusive Communities Project
v. Texas Department of Housing and Community Development. The Supreme Court
accepts amicus briefs as a way to ensure that interests beyond those of the two parties
involved in a case are taken into consideration when there is a potential for the decision
on the issue at hand to have far reaching legal effects.
Inclusive Communities is a case with potentially far reaching legal effects, as it will
address the question of whether the Fair Housing Act prohibits policies and practices
that have an unjustified discriminatory impact (as contrasted with policies and practices
that are intentionally discriminatory). This legal standard is at the heart of the Fair
Housing Act, has been approved by all circuit courts of appeals that have addressed the
issue, and is part of many of the most important landmark housing cases over the past
40 years. Amicus briefs are being submitted from a range of key players, one of which
is local governments. The Alliance was approached because the governments who
have joined the Alliance are committed to equity, including supporting the Fair Housing
Act which was designed to remedy the current effects of past discrimination.
The case is the third in a series of cases that has gone to the United States Supreme
Court centered on the issue of whether or not the Fair Housing Act includes
discriminatory impact. The prior two cases settled before a Supreme Court decision
was reached. Attached is a copy of the brief that was filed by local governments in last
year's case, Township of Mount Holly, et. Al v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action,
Inc., et al. The brief for the Inclusive Communities case will be substantively the same
in terms of the legal arguments that will be presented. Christine Van Aken, Deputy City
Attorney for San Francisco, is the point person for gathering signatures on behalf of
municipalities. She was involved with writing and filing the attached brief last year in the
Mt. Holly case. We hope to receive a copy of the brief for the current case by
December 12 and will forward it as soon as it is received.
Discussion
After receiving the request from the Alliance, I provided the amicus brief from the Mt.
Holly case to City Attorney Barry Lindahl. He and Assistant City Attorney Crenna
Brumwell have reviewed the brief and agree with the legal principles set forth in the
brief. I also have reviewed the brief and it is my recommendation that the City of
Dubuque join in signing on to the brief for the reasons described below.
First, in order to understand why the disparate impact legal standard is crucial to equity,
it is important to understand the distinction between individual, institutional, and
structural discrimination. Confusion about these terms can derail constructive
conversation about the continuing importance of civil rights law.
Individual discrimination refers to actions taken by an individual based on a protected
characteristic. A manager refusing to hire any qualified women is an example of
individual discrimination. Institutional discrimination refers to policies and practices that
work better for some groups than for other groups, often unintentionally. A leave policy
that does not include maternity leave would be an example of institutional
discrimination. While the leave policy is the same for all people, women are the group
impacted because they are the ones who go through the physical conditions related to
pregnancy and childbirth. Adding maternity leave to an institution's leave policy is an
example of taking a step to remedy institutional discrimination. Structural discrimination
refers to a history of institutional discrimination across institutions that combine to create
a system that continues to negatively impact a protected group. When we look at
national statistics that continue to show very few women in leadership positions in major
companies and institutions, we are seeing the current effects of a history of structural
discrimination.
Civil rights complaints have for many years focused primarily on individual intentional
discrimination - on one person attempting to prove the state of mind of another person.
While this type of discrimination is an important piece of the law, it is extremely difficult
to prove and often results in people becoming entrenched in their own perspective
regarding the reasons for their behavior and prevents any constructive problem solving.
Moreover, these complaints too often focus on the behavior of single individuals and
2
overlook the importance of patterns that are impacting the life opportunities of groups of
people —the realm of institutional and structural discrimination. People of good intent
can easily make decisions that result in a negative impact with far reaching effects,
making it important that we keep structural mechanisms in place to operate as a check
on this possibility.
The disparate impact standard shifts the focus away from the individuals involved in any
particular situation and toward examining the broader effect a decision may have. In
this way, it operates as a check on any one individual's bias and takes the additional
step of encouraging decision makers to consider whether or not the action being
proposed may negatively impact a group of people within a protected class. If so, it
further encourages decision makers to think through alternatives that may lessen that
impact while still reaching decision makers' legitimate goals. It is a problem solving
approach to protecting civil rights, and as we increasingly face complexities and
competing interests, it is important that we maintain a mechanism that requires
institutions to absorb the burden of insuring decisions are taking impact into account.
In the end, civil rights law was designed to operate like any law - to set a limit on our
individual beliefs and freedoms and require that we consider the impact of our actions
on others. The law is particularly important in its requirement that we consider whether
actions will have negative impacts beyond any single individual and especially on
groups that have experienced a history of being excluded from opportunities.
Action Requested
The action requested is that the City of Dubuque agree to join in the amicus brief being
written on behalf of local governments, supporting upholding disparate impact law under
the Fair Housing Act.
cc: Alvin Nash
Barry Lindahl
Crenna Brumwell
3
No.11-1507
3 n the 0$upreme Tourt of the Uniteb 0$ttttes
TOWNSHIP OF MOUNT HOLLY, et al.,
Petitioners,
U.
MT. HOLLY GARDENS CITIZENS IN ACTION, INC., et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
BRIEF FOR GOVERNMENTS OF SAN
FRANCISCO, ATLANTA, FLINT, NEW HAVEN,
PHILADELPHIA, TOLEDO, KING COUNTY,
WASHINGTON, and CITY OF
SEATTLE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
DENNIS J. HERRERA DAVID T. GOLDBERG*
San Francisco City Attorney Donahue & Goldberg, LLP
CHRISTINE VAN AKEN 99 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
Deputy City Attorney New York, NY 10013
City Attorney's Office (212) 334-8813
City Hall Room 234 david@donahuegoldberg.com
One Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Pl.
San Francisco, CA 94102
*Counsel of record
Additional Counsel Listed On Inside Cover
Additional Counsel:
CATHY HAMPTON DANIEL T. SATTERBERG
Atlanta City Attorney King County Prosecuting
KIMBERLY MILLER PATRICK Attorney
Deputy City Attorney PEGGY PAHL
68 Mitchell St., Suite 4100 Sr. Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Atlanta, GA 30303 W-400 King County Courthouse
Seattle, WA 98104
SHELLEY R. SMITH
City Solicitor VICTOR A. BOLDEN
JANE LOVITCH ISTVAN Corporation Counsel
Senior Attorney, Appeals Unit City of New Haven
City of Philadelphia Office of the Corporation
Law Department Counsel
1515 Arch Street 17th Floor 165 Church Street, 4th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102-1595 New Haven, CT 06510
ADAM LOUKX PETER S. HOLMES
Director of Law Seattle City Attorney
City of Toledo Law JOHN SCHOCHET
Department Assistant City Attorney
PO Box 94769
One Government Center
Suite 2250600 Fourth Avenue, 4th Floor
Toledo, OH 43604 Seattle, WA 98124-4769
PETER BADE
City Attorney
City of Flint
1101 S. Saginaw St.
Flint, MI 48502
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Statement of Interest..................................................1
Summary of Argument ...............................................3
Argument.....................................................................5
I. Petitioners Present No Valid Reason for
Departing From the Settled, Textually
Supported, and Administratively Codified
Construction of Section 804(a) ...........................5
A. Petitioners' Rendering of the Disparate
Impact Standard Neglects Important
Aspects of Its Design and Operation.........6
B. Long Experience Under Section
804(a)'s Disparate Impact Framework
Contradicts Petitioners' Predictions8
C. Petitioners' Abstract Assertions
Ignore the Realities of the Context in
Which Section 804(a) Operates ...............13
II. There Would Be Significant Costs —
Including Federalism Costs — to
Jettisoning Disparate Impact as a
Tool for Enforcing the FHA..............................18
A. The Impact Standard Avoids Intrusive
Inquiries into Government Motive and
Needless Polarization ..............................13
(I)
B. The Disparate Impact Standard
Performs a Distinct and Important
Role in Combatting Discrimination,
One That Benefits Municipalities and
All Their Residents ..................................22
III. Adherence to the Authoritative, Textually
Correct, and Settled Interpretation of
Section 804(a) Raises No Substantial
Equal Protection Concern ................................27
Conclusion .................................................................34
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
In re Alabama Employment
Discrimination Litigation,
198 F. 3d 1305 (11th Cir. 1999)......................8, 22
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)............11
Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224 239 (1998)......................................27
City of Arlington v. FCC,
133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013)...................................19, 27
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) ...............................32
City of Baltimore v. Wells, Fargo Bank, N.A.,
2011 WL 1557759 (D. Md. 2011)....................2, 26
Banks v. Hous. Auth. of City & Cnty. of San Francisco,
260 P.2d 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) ........................1
Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) ....................7, 21, 34
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)..................17
California Fed. Say. & Loan Assn v. Guerra,
479 U.S. 272 (1987).............................................34
iii
Citizens in Action v. Twp. of Mt. Holly,
2007 WL 1930457
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 5, 2007) ............12
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402 (1970).............................................15
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)................34
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982)..................23
City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community
Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188 (2003) .....................20
Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp.,
345 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2003)..............................10
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).......29, 30
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) .............19
Esperanza Peace and Justice Ctr. v.
City of San Antonio, 316 F. Supp. 2d 433
(W.D. Tex. 2001) .................................................19
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) ................17
Flores v. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) ...........12
Garza v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,
918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990) ..............................24
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 224 (1971).............................................22
iv
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc.,
551 U.S. 587 (2007)...............................................9
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012)...9
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999)...................10
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948)...........................17
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) ....................1
Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988) ......12, 33
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) ....33
Kennedy Park Homes Assn. v. City of
Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970)...........9
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).....................9
Langlois v. Abington Housing Auth.,
207 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2000) ...................................8
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.,
550 U.S. 618 (2007).............................................23
Matthews v. Columbia County,
294 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002)...........................20
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973).............................................22
City of Memphis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
2011 WL 1706756 (W.D. Tenn. 2011) ..................2
V
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v.
Village of Arlington Heights,
558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).............................25
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) ..............29, 31
Moshal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990)..........27
Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
2012 WL 1288489 (N.D. Ohio 2012) ..................12
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701 (2007)............................4, 28, 30, 32
Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams,
544 U.S. 113 (2005).............................................17
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) .......17
Reinhart v. Lincoln County, 482 F.3d 1225
(10th Cir. 2007)...................................................10
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) .............21, 32
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) ...........34
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) ......................27
Samaad v. City of Dallas,
940 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1991) ..............................23
Scarbrough v. Bd. Of Educ., 470 F.3d 250
(6th Cir. 2006)....................................................20
Vi
Scott-Harris u. City of Fall River,
134 F.3d 427 (1st Cir. 1997),
rev'd on other grounds, 523 U.S. 44 (1998)........20
Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970) ........10
Shelley v. Kraemer, 34 U.S. 1 (1948) ........................17
Sisemore v. Master Fin., Inc.,
151 Cal. App. 4th 1386 (Ct. App. 2007) .............12
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) .........24
Sunderland Family Treatment Serus. v. City
of Pasco, 26 P.3d 955 (Was. Ct. App. 2001) .......12
Teamsters u. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) .......7
Trafficante u. Met. Life Ins.,
409 U.S. 205 (1972).............................................26
United States u. City of Birmingham,
538 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Mich. 1982), aff'd
as modified, 727 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1984) ...19, 20
United States u. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc.,
474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973) ..............................17
Village of Arlington Heights u. Metropolitan
Housing Deu. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)......8, 20
Washington u. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) ............ 7, 8
Washington u. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,
458 U.S. 457 (1982).............................................20
Vii
Watson u. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
487 U.S. 977 (1988).....................................7, 8, 22
Weinberger u. Catholic Action,
454 U.S. 139 (1981).............................................21
White Oak Property Deut., LLC u. Washington
Township, 606 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 2010) ............10
Yich Wo u. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) .................17
Federal Statutes and Laws
Pub. L. 111-2 (2009) ..................................................23
42 U.S.C. § 1982 ........................................................17
42 U.S.C. §2000cc(a)(1) .............................................11
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)............................................passim
42 U.S.C. § 3604(e)....................................................24
42 U.S.C. § 36100(1) ..................................................1
42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(3) .................................................1
42 U.S.C. § 5110 ........................................................16
Federal Regulations
78 Fed. Reg. at 11,462 ...........................................7, 8
24 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(2) ..................................................11
24 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(4) ..................................................11
viii
24 C.F.R. § 58.40 .......................................................15
24 C.F.R. § 58.42 .......................................................15
24 C.F.R. § 58.5 .........................................................16
24 C.F.R. § 58.6 .........................................................16
24 C.F.R. § 84.44 .......................................................14
State and Municipal Law
Cal. Gov. Code § 65300 .............................................14
Cal. Gov. Code § 65302 .............................................15
Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21002 .....................................15
Cal. Gov't Code § 65008(b)).......................................11
CEQA Guideline 15093.............................................15
N.J. Stat. 10:5-3 ........................................................26
New York City Hum. Rights Law, § 8-107(17)........12
43 Pa. Stat. § 952 ......................................................25
Legislative Materials
H.R. Rep. No. 100-711 (1988) .....................................1
ix
Fair Housing Act of 1967, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Housing & Urban Affairs of
the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) .........................18, 24
Other Materials
Xavier de Souza Briggs, ed.,
The Geography of Opportunity (2005) ...............25
Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and
Desegregation: Decisionmahing in the
Supreme Court, 1948-1958,
68 Geo. L. J. 1 (1979) ..........................................21
Douglas Massey & Nancy Denton,
American Apartheid (1993) ................................18
Br. Amicus Curiae for Township of Mount
Holly, Magner u. Gallagher, No. 10-1032,
cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012) ..............28
Gunnar Myrdal,
An American Dilemma (1944)............................18
Natl. Comm'n on Fair Housing and
Equal Opportunity, The Future of
Fair Housing 13 (2008).......................................23
Note, Religious Land Use in the
Federal Courts Under RLUIPA,
120 Harv. L. Rev. 2178 (2007)............................12
x
Florence Wagman Roisman, Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing in Regional
Housing Markets, 42 Wake Forest L. Rev.
333 (2007)............................................................18
Patricia Salkin, The Quiet Revolution and
Federalism: Into The Future, 45 J. Marshall
L. Rev. 253 (2012) ...............................................17
Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact
Having Any Impact?An Appellate Analysis of
Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims under
the Fair Housing Act, 63 Am. U. L. Rev.
(forthcoming Dec. 2013)....................................8, 9
Margery Austin Turner and Lynette A. Rawlings,
Promoting Neighborhood Diversity
(Urban Inst. 2009) ........................................25, 26
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, Civil Rights Complaints in U.S.
District Courts, 1990-2006 (2008) ..................9, 10
xi
Statement of Interest*
Amici local governments have strong and direct
interest in and long experience with the legal issue
before this Court. We submit this brief both to
highlight the significant role the Fair Housing Act's
disparate impact framework plays in securing equal
opportunity and to respond to arguments that
considerations of "federalism" require jettisoning the
longstanding interpretation of the Fair Housing Act,
i.e., that compliance with the disparate impact
standard significantly burdens or distorts local
decisionmaking relating to housing and community
development.
While many municipal governments — along with
States, the federal government, and private actors in
the housing and lending industries — played a
regrettable role in creating the discriminatory living
patterns that supplied the impetus for fair housing
legislation, see, e.g., Banks u. Hous. Auth. of City &
Cnty. of San Francisco, 260 P.2d 668, 678 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1953), local governments later enacted the
Nation's first open housing laws, see, e.g., Hunter u.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), and the federal FHA
has, from its enactment, "recognize[d] the valuable
role state and local agencies play" in effectuating its
mandate. H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 35 (1988). See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(f)(1), 3608(e)(3). These
measures reflect recognition that all citizens, and
*Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici affirm that
no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part and
that no person other than amici and its counsel made a monetary
contribution to its preparation or submission. All parties' letters
consenting to the submission of amicus briefs have been filed
with the Clerk's Office.
1
local governments themselves, suffer harm when
discrimination go unaddressed.
That insight was dramatically confirmed in the
recent economic crisis, when predatory lending
directed at minority homeowners and neighborhoods
and the ensuing wave of foreclosures caused not only
great individual harm but serious damage to many
municipalities' fiscal and civic health. (Among the
local responses were important federal Fair Housing
Act suits brought by the cities of Baltimore and
Memphis on their own behalf, for redress for these
distinct harms. See Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore u. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2011 WL
1557759 (D. Md.); City of Memphis u. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 2011 WL 1706756 (W.D. Tenn.)).
Experience also makes amici especially well-
positioned to respond to — and refute — high-pitched
and highly abstract assertions by petitioners and
their amici that continued recognition of the
disparate impact standard threatens local self-
government or drives local authorities to "race-based"
decisionmaking. Contrary to these claims, the
disparate impact framework, by encouraging
articulation of justifications and consideration of
alternative, less discriminatory courses of action, has
both promoted more careful, inclusive
decisionmaking and provided a modest check against
actions that aggravate or needlessly entrench existing
discriminatory patterns. Moreover, the framework
spares local governments and their citizens from
intrusive, divisive disputes over the motivations of
government decisionmakers or project opponents.
2
Summary of Argument
In the decision below, the Third Circuit reinstated
respondents' claims under Section 804(a) of the Fair
Housing Act, applying the longstanding
interpretation of that provision, as forbidding both
intentional and disparate impact housing
discrimination. As respondents and other amici
convincingly demonstrate, the ordinary rules
governing the construction of federal statutes
establish the correctness of that decision.
Petitioners seek to override that result, based on
a series of increasingly broad and high-pitched
assertions about the consequences of allowing the
disparate impact framework to continue to operate.
Describing the standard as "a blunt instrument," Br.
44, the Township presents dire forecasts of what
"could" or "would" (Br. 44, 45) happen were the Third
Circuit's decision to be sustained, summoning images
of local officials, required or "drive[n]," Br. 42, by "the
specter of disparate-impact litigation" under Section
804(a), id. 44., "to engage in racial balancing in every
redevelopment choice." Id. Such a regime, they
assert, would trample on principles of federalism and
raise sufficiently grave constitutional questions to
warrant overturning an otherwise authoritative
construction.
Amici respectfully disagree, and we urge that the
Court uphold the settled, textually proper, and
administratively codified interpretation. In view of
the decades of experience nationwide under Section
804(a), there is no need for speculation about the
consequences of recognizing disparate impact
liability. That experience sharply contradicts
petitioners' warnings. By any objective measure, the
threat of Section 804(a) disparate impact liability (or
3
litigation) has proven exceedingly modest, and the
conduct the provision "requires" and "encourages" —
consideration of alternative and mitigating measures,
in the small set of cases where severe,
disproportionate impacts would result — are in fact
coextensive with obligations imposed under state law
and that local governments accept as participants in
federal housing and development programs.
Petitioners' depiction of the rule as an exotic or
significantly burdensome federal incursion also
ignores basic realities about the local policymaking
process it is said to "drive." Local government
decisions concerning major housing and
redevelopments are necessarily influenced by a vast
complex of competing and conflicting fiscal, political,
environmental, and housing policy considerations,
including numerous federal law requirements. These
types of decisions —as the prevalence of federal, state,
and local impact assessment procedures attest —both
allow for and benefit from careful and objective
evaluation of effects and alternatives.
Experience in fact establishes that the disparate
impact framework furthers important interests of
municipalities and their residents. The same reasons
why the standard is necessary and effective under
other civil rights statutes apply with full, if not
greater, force to housing discrimination. Indeed,
effective enforcement not only provides important
protection to individuals, but it protects
municipalities themselves and all their residents, of
all backgrounds, from serious harm. While the
"benefits" to local governments of the rule petitioners
seek are chimerical (it is the rare disparate impact
claim that cannot instead be pleaded as a "disparate
treatment" violation), the latter standard, by focusing
4
disputes on motives, makes both decisionmaking and
litigation more polarized — and more intrusive on
local self-government — than does the impact
framework's essentially objective inquiry.
Nor does the longstanding interpretation of
Section 804(a) raise genuine constitutional concerns,
let alone the "grave" ones that could authorize a court
to disregard a lawful agency interpretation. The
impact standard does not lead — has not led — to
"racial balancing." (Indeed, it is hard to see how the
relief sought in this case could be described as that).
What the settled construction does encourage —
advance consideration of a project's demographic
effects (along with many others) and seeking to avoid
actions that unnecessarily effect and reinforce
discrimination, when feasible alternatives are
present — are both lawful and appropriate. Indeed,
the constitutionality of such decisionmaking was
established with unusual clarity in the one Equal
Protection decision petitioners advance as basis for
"avoidance," Parents Involved in Community Schools,
which undertook explicitly to quell the very "doubts"
about government action that petitioners' arguments
seek to provoke.
ARGUMENT
I. Petitioners Present No Valid Reason for
Departing From the Settled, Textually
Supported, and Administratively Codified
Construction of Section 804(a)
Petitioners state no substantial ground in law or
policy for rejecting the longstanding and correct
interpretation of the Fair Housing Act.
For decades, Section 804(a) has been interpreted
as forbidding both housing practices that purposefully
5
discriminate on grounds of race, religion, sex,
disability, familial status and national origin and
those which unjustifiably have the effect of making
housing unavailable on those bases. That
construction has been adopted by eleven courts of
appeals; it has been the consistent understanding of
the agency charged with administering and enforcing
the Act, across nine presidential administrations; and
it has recently been codified in carefully-reasoned
notice-and-comment regulations promulgated under
congressionally-conferred rulemaking authority. And
as respondents show, that interpretation is the best,
arguably the only permissible, reading of the
statutory text, which, far from forbidding the
disparate impact framework, includes multiple
provisions (added to the Act at a time when judicial
consensus had settled) presupposing its availability.
Petitioners' invitation to invalidate the
longstanding construction based largely on predicted
(and, ironically, unintended) effects should be
rejected. Petitioners' warnings about the dangers the
disparate impact framework poses overlook
important features of its design and are without
support in, and strongly contradicted by, long
experience with Section 804(a)'s operation.
Petitioners' account likewise slights the important
ways that the longstanding interpretation benefits
local governments and the residents, of all
backgrounds, they serve.
A. Petitioners' Account of the Disparate Impact
Framework Neglects Central Aspects of Its
Design and Operation
Although the disparate impact standard, as the
Court has recognized, is not "the most easily
understood type of discrimination," Teamsters u.
6
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36, n.15 (1977), its
basic contours, both under Section 804(a) and related
statutes, are well settled, see 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,462,
and important features of its design and operation
risk being lost in petitioners' account.
On its own terms, the Section 804(a) disparate
impact standard does not impose any limit on the
substantive objectives a government or private
housing provider may choose to pursue. Rather, it
provides for an inquiry — only in those cases (not
"every" one Br. 44) where challengers have made out
a significant prima facie showing of discriminatory or
segregative effect, see infra — into the availability of
alternative means of pursuing the defendants'
objectives that would not yield results that are the
"functional[] equivalent" of purposeful
discrimination. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988).
By encouraging consideration of impacts of
alternative ways of proceeding — as do many other
laws in the housing development and land use field,
see infra Section I.C., the standard makes it less
likely that prior acts of intentional exclusion are
thoughtlessly repeated or unduly exacerbated. See
Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356, 374-75 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(recognizing that prejudice "may result ... from
insensitivity caused by simple want of careful,
rational reflection").
Moreover, "the line between discriminatory
purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as
bright" as invective arguments against the latter
presume. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 254
(1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). Although it is a
truism that "impact alone" does not establish
7
intentional discrimination — nor disparate impact
liability, for that matter, see Langlois u. Abington
Housing Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2000) —
evidence of disproportionate burden will typically
"provide [the] ... starting point" of the disparate
treatment analysis, Village of Arlington Heights u.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977).
And while there are significant differences
between the "the factual issues that typically
dominate in disparate impact cases," Watson, 487
U.S. at 987, both frameworks train on practices that
offend the law's core antidiscrimination mandate.
See In re Alabama Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 198 F. 3d 1305, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (If
"after a prima facie demonstration of discriminatory
impact, the employer cannot demonstrate that the
challenged practice is a job related business necessity,
what explanation can there be for the employer's use
of the discriminatory practice?").
B. Long Experience Under Section 804(a)'s
Disparate Impact Framework Contradicts
Petitioners' Predictions
While petitioners' aspersions are couched in
terms of what "would" or "may" happen were their
interpretation of Section 804(a) to be rejected, as if the
decision below and HUD regulations "established new
substantive law," 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,462, see, e.g., Br.
45-46, the availability of disparate impact analysis
under Section 804 (a) is settled law in eleven circuits
and has been, for decades.' Attempts to summon
' Indeed, as Washington u. Davis noted, in the time period
before they addressed this statutory question, numerous federal
courts had held that the Constitution imposed limits based on
8
objections — and even "constitutional" concerns —
based on actions driven the "specter of disparate-
impact litigation" founder on the fact that "[c]ourts
have recognized claims of this sort for over 30 years,
... and yet there is no indication that the system is
overwhelmed by these types of suits." Lafler u.
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389-90 (2012). As this
Court's recent decisions remind, when a rule "has
been around in the lower courts for 40 years... and
has not given rise to the dire consequences predicted
[for it]," Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC., 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012),
such "parade[s] of horribles" must be evaluated in
light of evidence that "none of these things has
happened," Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found.,
Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 614 (2007).
What has happened bears no resemblance to the
large-looming "specter," Br. 44, petitioners argue the
Court must act to prevent. By one careful count, there
have been just 92 appellate decisions addressing the
FHA disparate impact liability standard in the 45
years since the statute's enactment, many involving
private defendants, and only a small subset have been
successful. See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate
Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of
Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims under the
Fair Housing Act, 63 Am. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming Dec.
2013) (finding 18 appellate decisions favorable to
plaintiffs since 1968). At the trial court level, there
were 593 housing discrimination complaints of any
kind filed in federal courts in 2006, compared, e.g., to
13,042 cases alleging employment discrimination
discriminatory results. See 426 U.S. 229, 245 n12 (1976). See,
e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Assn. u. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d
108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970) (Clark. Ret. J.).
9
that year. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs, Civil Rights Complaints in U.S.
District Courts, 1990-2006 (2008).
Nor does experience confirm the premise that
lawsuits under the disparate impact standard are
especially costly or time-consuming to defend, relative
to disparate treatment suits, or are less amenable to
rapid disposition. Indeed, in practice, claims are
almost invariably brought under both theories, as this
one was, and rarely on the disparate impact theory
alone. See, e.g., Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d
290, 299 n.7 (5th Cir.2003) ("We ... decline to
differentiate claims of disparate impact and claims of
intentional discrimination at this preliminary stage
of litigation").
In circuits where the disparate impact framework
is settled law, large numbers of such claims are
dismissed prior to trial, commonly based on plaintiffs'
failure to make the rigorous showing needed for a
prima facie case. See, e.g., White Oak Property Deut.,
LLC u. Washington Township, 606 F.3d 842, 851 (6th
Cir. 2010); Reinhart u. Lincoln County, 482 F.3d 1225,
1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2007); Seicshnaydre, 63 Am. L.
Rev. Appendix A (collecting cases). Compare, e.g.,
Hunt u. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999) (holding
summary judgment inappropriate on intentional
discrimination claim, explaining that "[t]he task of
assessing a jurisdiction's motivation, however, is not
a simple matter; on the contrary, it is an inherently
complex endeavor, one requiring the trial court to
perform a `sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available."')
10
(quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights u. Metro Hous. Dev.
Co., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).2
And even leaving aside the considerable overlap
between the intent and impact standards, see supra,
obligations essentially identical to the ones
petitioners depict as uniquely and unduly
burdensome on local decisionmaking are imposed
under other federal laws and assumed voluntarily by
local governments through acceptance of federal
funding. Both Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act have long
been implemented through federal funding conditions
(including in housing and redevelopment programs)
requiring local governments' compliance with
disparate impact regulations. 24 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(2)
(Title VI); id. § 8.4(b)(4) (Rehabilitation Act). See
Shannon u. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 817 (3d Cir. 1970)
(invoking Title VI regulations "adopting an `effects'
test rather than an `intention' test for reviewing local
actions respecting location of types of housing"). Cf.
Alexander u. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (finding
no private right of action to enforce Title VI
regulations).
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act applies by express terms to local
government land use rules, see 42 U.S.C.
§2000cc(a)(1), imposing strictures (without any
inquiry into governmental intent) far more
demanding than Section 804's prohibition on
unjustifiable religion-based disparate impacts. See
id. (allowing local government to enforce generally
applicable land use regulations that burden religion
2 This case provides no counterexample: the district court
ruled (albeit erroneously) on summary judgment, without
having permitted discovery.
11
only if it proves they further "compelling" purposes
and are "the least restrictive means" of doing so);
Flores u. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997)
(highlighting that statutory standard is much more
stringent than a "discriminatory effects or disparate
impact test"); suits under that statute,
unsurprisingly, have had significant success. See
Note, Religious Land Use in the Federal Courts Under
RLUIPA, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 2178, 2199 (2007).
States and localities — including, notably, the
State from which this case arises —have incorporated
the disparate impact analysis into their own fair
housing laws. See Citizens In Action u. Twp. Of Mt.
Holly, 2007 WL 1930457 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
July 5, 2007) (recognizing that under state law "a
plaintiff may prevail on a racial discrimination
housing claim on evidence of discriminatory impact
alone," but holding impact claims unripe). See also
Sisemore u. Master Fin., Inc., 151 Cal. App. 4th 1386,
1419 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that state Fair
Employment and Housing Act "plainly authorizes a
claim for housing discrimination irrespective of
intent, where the alleged act or omission has the
effect of discriminating"); Keith u. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467,
485 (9th Cir. 1988) (same under Cal. Gov't Code
§ 65008(b)); N.Y.C. Hum. Rights Law § 8-107(17)
(providing cause of action for "an unlawful
discriminatory practice based upon disparate
impact"); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n u. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 2012 WL 1288489 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 16,
2012) (`Ohio courts have established that [disparate
impact] is applicable in the context of housing
discrimination"); Sunderland Family Treatment
Serus. v. City of Pasco, 26 P.3d 955, 961 (Ct. App.
2001) (holding that Washington Housing Policy Act
"has no intent requirement").
12
And, as is explained infra, local planners and
housing officials charged with approving and siting
development projects, as a matter of policy and sound
practice, take into account demographic effects (and
seek to avoid unjustifiable, disparate impacts).
Given the modesty of the "threat" of Section
804(a) disparate impact litigation and the existence of
these independent, overlapping obligations, it is
exceedingly implausible that the "financial and
political costs of litigating over ... racial impacts"
under Section 804(a), would induce a municipality to
"rationally conclude" Br. 46, that a beneficial and
otherwise-lawful plan should be shelved.
C. Petitioners' Abstract Assertions Ignore the
Realities of the Context in Which Section 804(a)
Operates
Petitioners' dire predictions also rely on an
unrealistic and wholly one-dimensional image of local
government decisionmaking, where officials' actions
are "driven" primarily by the "incentives," Br. 44, the
Section 804(a) disparate impact liability is claimed to
generate.
But as attorneys, planners, and housing officials
in amici and other municipalities can readily attest
that the risk of liability —or litigation —under Section
804(a) for unjustifiable disparate impact ranks well
down the very long list of considerations that
influence housing and development decisionmaking —
and would so rank even if the list were confined to
legal requirements (indeed even were it confined to
federal legal requirements, see infra).
1. The type of government decisions depicted as
driven by Section 804(a) compliance (or litigation
avoidance) are in reality influenced by an essentially
13
endless array of complex, inevitably cross-cutting
fiscal, political, legal, environmental, and policy
considerations. Local governments deciding whether,
how, and where to undertake a redevelopment project
must determine which populations the project should
serve; whether to construct a new building or
rehabilitate an existing structure; and whether to
build at high or lower density, for instance. Such
choices invariably implicate differences as to
governing philosophy, municipal priorities, and views
of wise housing policy (and are influenced, as well, by
the nature and availability of funding sources and the
array of political forces supportive of or opposed to a
particular choice).
Such planning decisions also and necessarily take
into account existing neighborhood characteristics
and land uses, local and long-term economic and
demographic trends, land acquisition and
construction costs, site characteristics — including
natural disaster risks and environmental
remediation needs; traffic volume and safety; access
to public transportation; the adequacy of utilities and
public services and proximity of parks, schools, and
health care facilities.
These lengthy but incomplete lists highlight a
further important reality: that decisionmaking
relating to large-scale projects (and many smaller
ones) almost always does — and as a matter of sound
practice, should — entail rigorous evaluation of these
many considerations both for the action contemplated
and for available alternatives.
Such assessments are performed pursuant to
state and local planning and environmental review
laws, which articulate objectives and priorities, see,
e.g., Cal. Gov. Code § 65300 (requiring city and county
14
general plans); id. § 65302 (specifying mandatory
subjects), and provide for, as California's
Environmental Quality Act does, a comprehensive,
"systematic" evaluation of a broad array of project
impacts, Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21002, often directing
that public agencies rejector modify proposed projects
"if there are feasible alternatives or feasible
mitigation measures available." Id. See also CEQA
Guideline 15093 (detailing requirements for written
"statement of overriding reasons").
Indeed, HUD regulations likewise provide (for all
but the smallest federally-supported housing and
development projects) that local governments
perform environmental assessments, which must,
among other things, "determine existing conditions
and describe the character, features and resources of
the project area and its surroundings"; identify and
analyze "all potential environmental impacts,
whether beneficial or adverse"; "[e]xamine and
recommend feasible ways in which the project ...
could be modified [and] alternatives to the project."
24 C.F.R. § 58.40. See id. § 58.42 (requiring full
Environmental Impact Statements for projects with
potentially significant effects); cf. Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 408 (1970)
(interpreting statutory provision prohibiting highway
construction in local public park without federal
agency determination of "no feasible and prudent
alternative routes or ... design changes ...to reduce
the harm").
The character of these local, federal, state and
local processes reinforces that the governmental
action Section 804(a) in fact encourages — careful,
serious examination of effects and justifications for
proposed actions, in light of the availability of feasible
15
alternatives and mitigations — is particularly
appropriate and nonintrusive.
2. Petitioners' efforts to depict Section 804(a) as a
rare or especially burdensome federal incursion into
exclusively local matters, or even as raising "Tenth
Amendment" concerns, likewise fail to account for the
realities of municipal decisionmaking in this field.
Such assertions of course neglect that the Third
Circuit's decision left the federal-local balance
precisely where it was struck decades ago, see supra,
and ignore the extent and magnitude of federal law's
presence and influence in this field. In reality, local
governments, by dint of their participation in federal
housing and community development programs that
have long provided both the impetus and funding for
such projects, must take account of countless federal
law policies and requirements including (as noted
above) civil rights environmental assessment laws,
ones relating to historic preservation, removal of
design barriers, lead paint abatement, energy
efficiency, and flood control, see 24 C.F.R. §§ 58.5,
58.6, not to mention federal rules limiting their use of
"cost plus" contracts, id. § 84.44(5)(c), requiring
payment of prevailing wages, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 5110, and promoting the hiring of public housing
tenants for construction work. 12 U.S.C. § 1701(u).3
3 Indeed, while land use regulation remains a core local
responsibility, see Br. 42-43, numerous other federal laws alter
historic authority in ways far more direct than Section 804(a)
could be claimed to. Unlike the disparate impact standard,
which calls upon local officials to justify a small subset of actions
that meet the prima facie test, in light of available, less
discriminatory alternatives (or even RLUIPA), the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 "impose[s] specific limitations
on the traditional authority of state and local governments to
16
And suggestions of"Tenth Amendment" concerns,
Br. 42, fail for a more basic reason: Discrimination in
housing and in land use regulation has long, and
properly, been the special concern of federal law,
dating back to the Reconstruction Congress's
enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1982. See Hurd u. Hodge,
334 U.S. 24, 31-32 (1948); Buchanan u. Worley, 245
U.S. 60, 79 (1917) (invalidating municipal segregation
ordinance); see also Shelley u. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) (forbidding state law enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants); Yich Wo u. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 373-74 (1886) (holding that San Francisco's
administration of a commercial zoning ordinance
violated Equal Protection). See generally Fitzpatrick
u. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) ("[T]he Eleventh
Amendment and the principle of state sovereignty
which it embodies are necessarily limited by
[Reconstruction Amendments].") (citation omitted);
United States u. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d
115, 120 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding FHA to be lawful
exercise of Thirteenth Amendment enforcement
power).¢
regulate the location, construction, and modification of[cellular
tower] facilities," Rancho Palos Verdes u.Abrams, 544 U.S. 113,
115 (2005). See also, e.g.,Rapanos u. United States, 547 U.S. 715
(2006) (describing federal Clean Water Act oversight of wetlands
development). See Patricia Salkin, The Quiet Revolution and
Federalism: Into The Future, 45 J. Marshall L. Rev. 253, 255
(2012) (`The federal government, [while]... seemingly
maintaining a low profile...has probably had the greatest
influence on local land use control over the last forty years.").
4 It bears emphasis that the federal government's historic
role with respect to housing discrimination has hardly been
consistently constructive. As scholars and courts have detailed
and the government itself has acknowledged, the federal
government for decades administered its housing programs in a
discriminatory manner and took myriad actions that encouraged
17
II. There Would Be Significant Costs — Including
Federalism Costs — to Jettisoning Disparate
Impact as a Tool for Enforcing the FHA
A. The Impact Standard Avoids Intrusive Inquiries
into Government Motive and Needless
Polarization
Petitioners' arguments also ignore a significant
demerit of the regime they invite the Court to impose
in the name of "federalism": the extent to which a
federal standard requiring those challenging their
exclusion from housing to prove discriminatory intent
can itself be "divisive," Br. 47, and carry heavy
"political costs." Id. at 46. Cf. City of Arlington u.
and aggravated discrimination by local actors, both public and
private. See DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID (1993); GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA
625 (1944) (federal housing policies had "served as devices to
strengthen and widen rather than to mitigate residential
segregation."). The Department of Justice's 1967 submission to
Congress supporting the Fair Housing Act acknowledged the
federal government's involvement in numerous"denials of equal
protection," including ones responsible for creating "thousands
of racially segregated neighborhoods [and affecting] millions of
people." Fair Housing Act of 1967, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Housing & Urban Affairs of the S. Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. (1967) at 8 (quoted in
Florence Wagman Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair
Housing in Regional Housing Markets, 42 Wake Forest L. Rev.
333, 391 (2007)). This recognition — "[that] the force which
helped to spawn [segregation] must take the lead in helping to
solve it," id. at 377-78 (quoting Sen. Robert Kennedy)—impelled
Congress to enact the FHA and impose on HUD, other federal
agencies, and fund recipients obligations to "affirmatively
further fair housing." See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608(d), 5304(b)(2).
18
FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2013) (rejecting a "faux-
federalism" argument). Indeed, the central difference
between the two modes of proof is that the impact
standard directs the parties' and courts' attention
toward objective aspects of a disputed action and its
alternatives, while the disparate treatment inquiry
focuses on the sincerity of policymakers' (and, in
certain cases, citizen advocates') explanations of their
motives for favoring their chosen course.
These latter inquiries raise grave conceptual and
adjudicative difficulties. See Edwards u. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 638 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing motive inquiry as "almost always an
impossible task"). Accord Esperanza Peace and
Justice Ctr. u. City of San Antonio, 316 F. Supp. 2d
433, 453 (W.D. Tex. 2001) ("It [is] ...an exceedingly
difficult and perilous enterprise to establish the
intent of a lone legislator. And when the legislative
body consists of numerous legislators, each with his
or her own myriad and conflicting motivations, the
plaintiffs burden is multiplied, if not impossible").
For example, the court in United States u. City of
Birmingham, 538 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Mich. 1982),
undertook to determine whether intentional
discrimination had been established by proof that
"[r]acial concerns were a motivating factor behind the
opposition of at least two of the four members of the
majority faction" that had defeated a housing
development, id. at 829, and it ultimately imposed
liability based on a finding that "[r]egardless of their
personal views, all four members felt bound by the
results of [a referendum and] were aware that a
significant number of [referendum voters had been]
... motivated in part by a desire to exclude black
19
people from the City." Id. Aff'd as modified,_ 727 F.2d
560 (6th Cir. 1984).5
As Arlington Heights itself recognized, "[j]udicial
inquiries into legislative or executive motivation
represent a substantial intrusion," 429 U.S. at 268,
and the intent standard allows those alleging
discrimination to seek discovery and testimony from
government officials as to their purposes. Id. See, e.g.,
Scott-Harris, 134 F.3d at 439 (rejecting municipal
liability because "the motivations of [most] council
members ... did not receive individualized scrutiny,"
and highlighting, as basis for that ruling, plaintiff's
failure to "depose[] any of the seven [council members]
[]or call[] them as witnesses at trial"), rev'd on other
grounds, 523 U.S. 44. See also City of Cuyahoga Falls
v. Buckeye Community Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188,
196 (2003) (affirming that "statements made by
private individuals in the course of a citizen-driven
petition drive [are] sometimes relevant to equal
protection analysis") (citing Washington v. Seattle
School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 471 (1982)).
Finally, accusations of bigotry and litigation over
motives are invariably divisive and polarizing.
Unlike a disparate impact case, where those
challenging government action can proceed, without
impugning the good faith and sincerity of individual
6 Compare also Matthews u. Columbia County, 294 F.3d
1294, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 2002) (Section 1983 municipal liability
requires proof of improper motives by a majority of a multi-
member body) with Scott-Harris u. City of Fall River, 134 F.3d
427, 436-40 (1st Cir. 1997) (applying a "significant blod' test to
determine intent), rev'd on other grounds, 523 U.S. 44 (1998),
and Scarbrough v. Bd. Of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 261-63 (6th Cir.
2006) (adopting a "but fox" causal analysis for such
determinations).
20
officials, to contest the gravity of the impact or the
feasibility of identified alternatives, °[i]t is a most
serious charge to say a State [or local government
official] has engaged in a pattern or practice designed
to deny its citizens the equal protection of the laws."
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and
Desegregation: Decisionmahing in the Supreme Court,
1948-1958, 68 Geo. L. J. 1, 42 (1979) (quoting Chief
Justice Warren's memo to the Conference that
opinions in Brown u. Board of Education "should be
short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical,
unemotional, and, above all, non-accusatory").
Indeed, this focus on objective facts relating to
impacts and available alternatives promotes more
constructive and substantive decisionmaking for the
vastly larger number of instances that never reach a
courthouse. See e.g., Ricci u. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557,
585 (2009) (noting that when employer solicits input
"during the [civil service] test-design stage ... to
ensure the test is fair, that process can provide a
common ground for open discussions"). Those
affected by proposed government actions can seek to
work with decisionmakers without weakening claims
of invidious intent; officials have reason to consider
and respond to alternative submissions on their
merits, including by modifying plans based on
meritorious ones. And even when plans proceed
unmodified, the public and affected citizens receive
some assurance that their interests and concerns
received consideration. Cf. Weinberger u. Catholic
Action, 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981) (through NEPA's
requirement of EIS publication, "the public is made
aware that the agency has taken environmental
considerations into account").
21
B. The Disparate Impact Standard Performs a
Distinct and Important Role in Combatting
Discrimination, One That Benefits
Municipalities and All Their Residents
Unsurprisingly, petitioners'brief scarcely adverts
to the principal reasons, many canvassed in opinions
of this Court, why Congress, HUD, and state and local
governments have adopted the disparate impact
framework as part of their fair housing laws.
First, the standard can provide proper redress in
cases where purposeful disparate treatment is
present, but difficult to detect and prove, getting at
"[d]iscrimination [that] could actually exist under the
guise of compliance with [Title VII]." Griggs u. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 435 (1971) (citation omitted).
Cf. Alabama Employment Discrimination Litigation,
198 F. 3d at 1322 (`what [other] explanation can there
be...?" for adherence to a practice shown to produce
large disparities once equally effective,
nondiscriminatory alternatives have been
established).
Moreover, discriminatory effects standards push
against actions that perpetuate and aggravate the
present effects of prior purposeful discrimination,
reaching practices that "operate to `freeze' the status
quo of prior discriminat[ion]." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430
(1971); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. u. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973) (impact rules ensure that
earlier discrimination does not "work a cumulative
and invidious burden on [minority] citizens for the
remainder of their lives"). And the standard, by
promoting objective analysis of alternatives, can
prevent discrimination that would otherwise result
from unexamined assumptions or unconscious
prejudices. See also Watson, 487 U.S. at 990-91
22
("[E]ven if one assumed that [discrimination through
subjective employment criteria] can be adequately
policed through disparate treatment analysis, the
problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices
would remain"); Connecticut u. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 449
(1982) (describing disparate impact as serving a
"prophylactic" role).
It is not, as petitioners suggest, "altogether
rational" to authorize disparate impact liability in
employment, but not housing, discrimination law, Br.
27. Each one of these rationales applies with great
force in the fair housing context. Rigorous studies
confirm that present-day intentional housing
discrimination is remarkably pervasive, see, e.g.,
Natl. Comm'n on Fair Housing and Equal
Opportunity, The Future of Fair Housing 13 (2008)
(finding more than four million instances of housing
discrimination annually); and much of it involves
practices — such as steering minority homebuyers to
"minority" neighborhoods or failing to offer prime
mortgage terms to those who qualify—that are surely
not "eas[y] to identify and prosecute." Br. 28. Cf.
Ledbetter u. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550
U.S. 618, 649 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("A
worker knows immediately if she is denied a
promotion or transfer, if she is fired or refused e are
generally public events, known to co-workers."),
superseded by statute, Pub. L. 111-2 (2009). And in
cases like this one, it can be practically impossible to
identify a "similarly situated," but differently treated,
comparator. See Samaad u. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d
925, 941 (5th Cir. 199 1) ("Because the plaintiffs failed
to allege the existence of a similarly situated non-
minority neighborhood ... their complaint does not
allege an equal protection violation.").
23
Moreover, as the framers of the FHA understood,
market forces cannot always be relied upon to correct
intentionally discriminatory practices. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 3604(e) (anti-blockbustingprovision, making
unlawful "[fJor profit, to induce or attempt to induce
any person to sell or rent any dwelling by
representations regarding the entry or prospective
entry into the neighborhood of a person or persons of
a particular race"); accord Garza u. Cnty. of Los
Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 778 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Kozinski, J., concurring in part). Compare Br.
Amicus Curiae American Ins. Ass'n at 14 (arguing
that "market-driven incentives" "ensure" that
insurance rates are nondiscriminatory).
Equally important, present residential
demographic patterns are, to a great degree, the
direct result of purposefully discriminatory acts,
perpetrated on a vast scale, decades ago by the federal
government, states, localities, and private actors. See
Fair Housing Act of 1967, Hearings Before Subcomm.
Housing & Urban Affairs, S. Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong. (1967) at 8 (Department of
Justice's acknowledgment of the "peculiarly enduring
character" of "evil" done by Federal Housing
Administration's discriminatory lending rules:
"Thousands of racially segregated neighborhoods
were built, millions of people re-assorted on the basis
of race, color, or class, the differences built in, in
neighborhoods from coast to coast"). Cf. Smith u. City
of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 258-59 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment) (objecting to decision
upholding impact liability under the ADEA, noting
that "no one would argue that older workers have
suffered disadvantages as a result of entrenched
historical patterns of discrimination"). Present-day
housing and development decisions will have
24
similarly enduring effects; and, as scholars and courts
have found, policies affecting where a person resides
— and where housing has been made unavailable to
him — have far-reaching effects on educational and
employment opportunity, health and safety, and the
ability to accumulate wealth. See 43 Pa. Stat. § 952
(legislative finding that discrimination in housing
11result[s] in racial segregation in public schools and
other community facilities"); see generally XAVIER DE
SOUZA BRIGGS, ED., THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY
7, 8 (2005); Margery Austin Turner and Lynette A.
Rawlings, Promoting Neighborhood Diversity (Urban
Inst. 2009) (`Decades of scholarly research have
documented [how] ... the persistence of segregation
sustains racial and ethnic inequality in the United
States and undermines prospects for long-term
prosperity").
As the Seventh Circuit reasoned in its decision
finding disparate impact liability on remand in
Arlington Heights, the impact standard properly
captures that Congress did not enact the
Section 804(a) remedy as punishment for actors with
retrograde attitudes, but rather to open up housing
opportunities where exclusion long prevailed. See
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1292-93 (7th Cir.
1977) ("If the effect of a zoning scheme is to
perpetuate segregated housing, neither common
sense nor the rationale of the Fair Housing Act
dictates that the preclusion of minorities in advance
should be favored over the preclusion of minorities in
reaction to a plan which would create integration.").
Perhaps most important, the benefits the Fair
Housing Act generally — and the longstanding
interpretation of Section 804(a) — seek to secure are
25
not limited to members of groups that historically
have been subject to disadvantage. As the framers of
the Act believed, Americans of every background
benefit from open housing patterns. See, e.g.,
Trafficante u. Met. Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972)
(upholding FHA standing based on white residents'
allegations they "had lost the social benefits of living
in an integrated community [and] had missed
business and professional advantages").
Moreover, as many state and local governments
have recognized, these harms are not solely
individual: "Discrimination threatens not only the
rights and privileges of [a State's] inhabitants ... . but
menaces the institutions and foundations of a free
democratic State." N.J. Stat. 10:5-3. In concrete
terms, "[h]igh levels of segregation [have been found
to] ... constrain the vitality and economic
performance of metropolitan regions," Turner and
Rawlings, supra, at 3 (citing sources). Indeed,
experience in the recent economic crisis provided a
potent, unsettling reminder of the distinct municipal
injuries that unaddressed housing discrimination can
wreak. The wave of foreclosures that resulted from
discriminatory landing practices directed at residents
of minority communities in many municipalities
injured not only the homeowners targeted and their
immediate neighborhoods, but entire cities, their local
governments, residents, and taxpayers — who
incurred a wide array of fiscal, economic and civic
harms, comparable in scope to those wrought by
massive natural disasters. See Mayor & City Council
of Baltimore u. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2011 WL
1557759 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2011) (allowing Fair
Housing Act suit brought for municipal injuries to
proceed).
26
III. Adherence to the Authoritative, Textually
Correct, and Settled Interpretation of Section
804(a) Raises No Substantial Equal Protection
Concern
The Township's attempted enlistment of
avoidance canons to overcome the binding and
textually correct interpretation of Section 804(a) fails,
because the long-accepted construction raises no
"grave" or even substantially plausible Equal
Protection concern.
Canons based on constitutional doubt, as the
Court has long emphasized, do not apply "whenever
there arises a significant constitutional question the
answer to which is not obvious," Almendarez-Torres
v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239 (1998), but rather
only in cases where constitutional objections are
"grave." Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991)
(quotation omitted). Were it otherwise, that doctrine,
meant to promote judicial self-restraint, would
instead supplant Chevron rules whenever an
administrative interpretation could, through
argumentative ingenuity, be said to implicate some
"constitutional" interest, be it in private property
ownership, free speech, federalism, or liberty —which
is to say in nearly every case. See City of Arlington,
133 S. Ct. at 1871-73; accord Moshal v. United States,
498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (rule of lenity for criminal
statutes is not triggered whenever it is "possible to
articulate a construction more narrow than that
urged by the Government").
Petitioners do not meet that standard. They
insist that the settled interpretation of Section 804(a),
by encouraging governments and other housing
providers to consider the racial (and other) impacts of
proposed courses of action —and to avoid those which
27
cause unjustifiable disparate impacts when
alternatives are available — raises serious
"constitutional questions under the Equal Protection
Clause," citing both this Court's prohibition against
measures that "treat[] each [citizen] in different
fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual
typing by race," Br. 39 (quoting Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 11 551 U.S. 701,
779 (2007) (Opinion of Kennedy, J.)), and the claimed
danger that "incentives," Br. 38, 44, 45, presented by
Section 804(a)'s disparate impact standard will
"drive" local officials to "racial balancing." Br. 42, 44.
Notably, these "constitutional questions," Br. 39,
were not "serious" enough for petitioners to plead as
a defense to liability or even to advance as part of
their interpretation argument prior to the grant of
certiorari. Indeed, the constitutional problems they
perceive are at odds with what petitioners did argue
in their previous brief to this Court on this same
statutory question. Two Terms ago, as amicus curiae
in Magner v. Gallagher, the Township urged that the
Court "limit[] disparate impact claims to those
situations where there is evidence of segregative
effect," i.e., a standard by which governments (and, in
the event of litigation, courts) would assess whether
°a housing policy has the effect of keeping minorities
out of a predominately white neighborhood, or ... the
effect of keeping minorities in a predominately
minority neighborhood" — precisely the sort of
consideration of comparative demographic impacts
now decried as impermissibly "race-based" and
constitutionally doubtful. See Br. Amicus Curiae, No.
10-1032 at 8 (emphasis added), cert. dismissed, 132 S.
Ct. 1306 (2012).
28
The avoidance plea in fact rests on a
misunderstanding of the disparate impact framework
and a serious misreading of the precedent said to
raise constitutional doubt. As just explained, the
open housing aims the standard advances benefit
Americans of all backgrounds. (In fact, although
petitioners focus on "race," the disparate impact
standard applies to all the characteristics
enumerated in Section 804(a); almost every American
could be subject to housing discrimination on one or
more of those bases). Nor, as explained above, is the
image of local decisionmaking, driven to "racial
balancing," (or family-status balancing) by the need
to avoid Section 804(a) litigation, a remotely plausible
one. Municipal officials no more subordinate to "race"
the vast complex of political, legal, budgetary,
environmental, and policy considerations that
influence decisionmaking in this field than the
availability of Title VII's disparate impact standard to
overturn height requirements that exclude physically
able female prison guards candidates, see Dothard u.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), ushers in a system of
"gender-based" hiring decisions in corrections. See
generally Miller u. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995)
(directing courts to "exercise extraordinary caution"
in adjudicating claims that race was the predominant
factor, even when government actor's "awareness of
demographic impacts — and its affirmative efforts to
comply with a federal civil rights statute
incorporating an effects test — are undisputed).
On the contrary, Section 804(a)'s disparate
impact analysis is meant to operate, as it did in
Dothard, to leave government actors free to pursue
their chosen, legitimate policy ends, while
encouraging more careful attention to unnecessary,
exclusionary effects. See 433 U.S. at 332
29
(emphasizing that Alabama's "purpose could be
achieved by adopting ... a test for applicants that
measures strength directly"). Indeed, in cases like
this, the standard operates in a setting where
analysis of impacts and competing alternatives is
already the norm, providing a modest check on
heedless or habit-driven, but very consequential,
government actions. See Section I.C, supra.
Remarkably, petitioners' claim of Equal
Protection problems rests on a single decision of this
Court, Justice Kennedy's controlling opinion in
Parents Involved; more remarkably, that decision
directly forecloses their constitutional arguments —
and even undertakes affirmatively to quell doubts.
That opinion disavowed as "profoundly
mistaken," 551 U.S. 778, an understanding of Equal
Protection as treating as suspect any government
action (apart from remedying a particularized
constitutional violation) with a "racial" goal (such as
overcoming segregated residential patterns to
"bring[] together students of diverse backgrounds and
races," id. at 789) or that pursues these though "race-
conscious" means, id. The decision established a
sharp, constitutional line between, on one hand,
governmental acts that "assign[] ... a personal
designation according to a crude system of individual
racial classifications," and, on the other, "race-
conscious measures [that] address ... [racial isolation]
in a general way," affirming that the Constitution
leaves local authorities "free to" pursue the latter
type. Id. at 788-89 (emphasis supplied).
The opinion then explained specifically that the
Equal Protection Clause poses no barrier to
mechanisms such as "strategic site selection of new
schools; drawing attendance zones with general
30
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods ...
and tracking enrollments, performance, and other
statistics by race." Id. at 789. Those measures are
essentially indistinguishable from what the Fair
Housing Act's disparate impact standard encourages
— and petitioners posit are objectionable.
Indeed, as if anticipating the assertions of
"constitutional doubt" the Court's holding might
mistakenly be claimed to support, Justice Kennedy's
opinion undertook expressly to assure government
officials of the lawfulness of taking into account the
demographic consequences of competing, alternative
courses of action:
Executive and legislative branches, which for
generations now have considered these types of
policies and procedures, should be permitted to
employ them with candor and with confidence
that a constitutional violation does not occur
whenever a decisionmaker considers the impact a
given approach might have on students of
different races.
Id. at 789.
Miller u. Johnson, the only other Equal Protection
decision petitioners' avoidance argument even
discusses, offers no substantive support. Although
the Miller decision referenced constitutional doubts
as a ground for rejecting an administrative
construction, id. at 923, the agency whose
interpretation was before the Court, the Department
of Justice, held unusual power to disapprove state
districting legislation, and the "interpretation" at
issue, which conditioned federal approval on States'
maximizing the number of districts in which African-
American voters would be an effective majority,
31
required exactly the subordination of non-racial
districting factors that the Court had held the
Constitution prohibits. See 515 U.S. at 916.6
Indeed, petitioners' Equal Protection logic would
condemn as impermissibly "race-based" Justice
Thomas's dissenting opinion in Kelo u. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), which, in language
resonant here: (1) took note of the extreme
demographic impacts of redevelopment projects, see
id. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that "[o]ver
97 percent of the individuals forcibly removed from
6 Unlike some amici, petitioners do not claim that Justice
Scalia's short concurring opinion in Ricci u. DeStefano,
hypothesizing an eventual "war' between Equal Protection and
disparate impact, see 557 U.S. at 594, would be a proper basis
for departing from an authoritative agency interpretation. No
other Justice joined that opinion, and if such expressions in
separate opinions sufficed to trigger "constitutional avoidance"
canons, many more statutes would require narrow construction,
see, e.g., Baze u. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment) (concluding that death penalty is"cruel
and unusual punishment," in violation of the Eighth
Amendment). In fact, no previous opinion of the Court, including
landmark ones announcing and applying the disparate impact
standard, adverted to any such constitutional doubt. And the
opinion for the Court in Ricci, echoing the controlling opinion in
Parents Involved, drew a distinction (under Title VII) between
race-based invalidation of individual employees' civil service test
results and"considering, before administering a test or practice,
how to design that test or practice in order to provide a fair
opportunity for all individuals, regardless of their race." 557
U.S. at 585.
Petitioners' relative reticence can be read as implicit
acknowledgement that accepting the proposition that disparate
impact rules — by encouraging public and private parties to
consider the racial or gender effects of policy alternatives—are
(or even might be) a facial violation of Equal Protection would
entail a startling repudiation of decades of settled law.
32
their homes by the `slum-clearance project upheld by
this Court in [Parker u.] Berman were black"); (2) saw
these effects on "predominantly minority
communities" as itself warrant for inquiry into the
justification for the action, see id. (suggesting
heightened scrutiny, in light of the"powerless groups"
burdened and benefits to "citizens with
disproportionate influence and power in the political
process, including large corporations and
development firms"); and (3) viewed present actions
that have the "predictable consequence of
exacerbat[ing] these effects," as "regrettabl[e]," id. —
to be avoided, presumably, to the extent alternatives
are available. See Keith u. Volpe, 858 F.2d at 483
(applying § 804(a)'s disparate impact test to
invalidate city's refusal to permit development that
would provide housing to residents displaced by
highway project).
Finally, the "constitutional" understanding
petitioners casually advance (for the limited purpose
of escaping a correct and otherwise controlling agency
interpretation) is, in fact, seriously at odds with the
appeals to federalism that populate their brief. In
addition to its other far-reaching implications, the
rule they invite the Court to issue (or at least
pronounce "serious") would cast unwarranted doubt
on the vast number of local and state
antidiscrimination laws that incorporate the
disparate impact analysis.
That inhibition on state and local governments'
power to make decisions about the laws and
standards necessary to protect their citizens and
themselves from the harms of discrimination would
represent a dramatic and unwarranted shift in the
longstanding federal-state balance. As the Court has
33
recognized, the first state and local
antidiscrimination laws pre-dated the federal statute
invalidated in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883), and in the decades from that decision "until
the Federal Government reentered the field in 19571"
those laws provided the primary protection against
many types of discrimination. See Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984). See also 109 U.S.
at 19 (referencing State authority). Since then, state
and local governments, which are closer to the
problem and bear the harms of discrimination more
directly, have led the way in identifying harmful
practices and devising more effective remedies, often
enacting antidiscrimination measures that "give[]
greater protection" than do federal laws. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1691d (exempting such laws from preemption by
federal lending discrimination statute). See
California Fed. Say. & LoanAss'n u. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272, 287-88 (1987); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 n.5
(noting "by the time that Congress enacted the ADA
in 1990, every State in the Union had enacted ...
measures" prohibiting disability discrimination); id.
at 374-75 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (crediting such
statutes for providing "an incentive...to develop a
better understanding, a more decent perspective").
Conclusion
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.
34
Respectfully submitted,
DENNIS J. HERRERA DAVID T. GOLDBERG*
San Francisco City Attorney Donahue & Goldberg, LLP
CHRISTINE VAN AKEN 99 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
Deputy City Attorney New York, NY 10013
City Attorney's Office (212) 334-8813
City Hall Room 234 david@donahuegoldber.com
One Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Pl.
San Francisco, CA 94102 PETER BADE
City Attorney
CATHY HAMPTON City of Flint
Atlanta City Attorney 1101 S. Saginaw St.
KIMBERLY MILLER PATRICK Flint, MI 48502
Deputy City Attorney
68 Mitchell St., Suite 4100 DANIEL T. SATTERBERG
Atlanta, GA 30303 King County Prosecuting
Attorney
SHELLEY R. SMITH PEGGY PAHL
City Solicitor Sr. Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
JANE LOVITCH ISTVAN W-400 King County Courthouse
Senior Attorney, Appeals Unit Seattle, WA 98104
City of Philadelphia
Law Department VICTOR A. BOLDEN
1515 Arch Street 17th Floor Corporation Counsel
Philadelphia, PA 19102-1595 City of New Haven
Office of the Corporation
ADAM LOUKX Counsel
Director of Law 165 Church Street, 4th Floor
City of Toledo Law Department New Haven, CT 06510
One Government Center PETER S. HOLMES
Suite 2250 Seattle City Attorney
Toledo, OH 43604 JOHN SCHOCHET
Assistant City Attorney
PO Box 94769
600 Fourth Avenue, 4th Floor
Seattle, WA 98124-4769
*Counsel of Record
35
Statement of Interest*
Amici local governments have strong and direct
interest in and long experience with the legal issue
before this Court. We submit this brief to describe
for the Court the modest demands that the disparate
impact standard has imposed on local
decisionmaking relating to housing and community
development and to highlight the significant role the
Fair Housing Act's disparate impact framework
plays in securing equal opportunity.
While many municipal governments — along with
States, the federal government, and private actors in
the housing and lending industries — played a
regrettable role in creating the discriminatory living
patterns that supplied the impetus for fair housing
legislation, see, e.g., Banks u. Hous. Auth. of City &
Cnty. of San Francisco, 260 P.2d 668, 678 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1953), local governments later enacted the
Nation's first open housing laws, see, e.g., Hunter u.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), and the federal FHA
has, from its enactment, "recognize[d] the valuable
role state and local agencies play" in effectuating its
mandate. H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 35 (1988). See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(f)(1), 3608(e)(3). These
measures reflect recognition that all citizens, and
local governments themselves, suffer harm when
discrimination goes unaddressed.
* Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici affirm that
no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part
and that no person other than amici and its counsel made a
monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. All
parties' letters consenting to the submission of amicus briefs
have been filed with the ClerWs Office.
1
Experience also makes amici especially well-
positioned to respond to high-pitched assertions by
petitioners and their amici that continued
recognition of the longstanding disparate impact
standard threatens worthy housing policies or
developments or drives local authorities to "make
race-based decisions to avoid disparate-impact
liability." Br. 44. Contrary to these claims, the
disparate impact framework, by encouraging
articulation of justifications and consideration of
alternative, less discriminatory courses of action, has
both promoted more careful, inclusive
decisionmaking and provided a modest check against
actions that aggravate or needlessly entrench
existing discriminatory patterns. Moreover, the
framework spares local governments and their
citizens from intrusive, divisive disputes over the
motivations of government decisionmakers or project
opponents.
2
Summary of Argument
In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals applied its prior precedent to hold that a
violation of Section 804(a) of the Fair Housing Act
may be shown either by proof of intentional
discrimination or by proof of disparate impact, and
remanded the case to the district court for
application of that statute's burden-shifting
standards. Pet. App. PIN. As respondent and other
amici convincingly demonstrate, the ordinary rules
governing the construction of federal statutes
establish the correctness of that decision.
Petitioners' and their amici's arguments to this
Court for a contrary rule are based not only on
statutory interpretation claims but also on a series of
broad assertions about the consequences of allowing
the disparate impact framework to continue to
operate. Petitioners contend that disparate-impact
rules "effectively compel entities to engage in race-
conscious decisionmaking in order to avoid legal
liability," TDHCA Br. 43, while amici warn that
affordable housing providers face "staggering"
implications from disparate-impact liability, Br. of
Nat'l Leased Hous. Ass'n et al. 21, or that the
construction and redevelopment of certain affordable
housing projects in major cities will simply grind to a
halt, Br. of Houston Hous. Auth. 7. Such a regime,
they assert, would raise sufficiently grave
constitutional and policy questions to warrant
overturning an otherwise authoritative construction.
Amici respectfully disagree, and we urge the
Court to uphold the settled, textually proper, and
administratively codified interpretation. In view of
the decades of experience nationwide under Section
804(a), there is no need for speculation about the
3
consequences of recognizing disparate impact
liability. That experience sharply contradicts
petitioners' warnings. By any objective measure, the
threat of Section 804(a) disparate impact liability (or
litigation) has proven exceedingly modest, and the
conduct the provision "requires" and "encourages" —
consideration of alternative and mitigating
measures, in the small set of cases where severe,
disproportionate impacts would result — are in fact
coextensive with obligations imposed under state
law and that local governments accept as
participants in federal housing and development
programs.
Petitioners' depiction of the rule as an exotic or
significantly burdensome federal incursion also
ignores basic realities about the local policymaking
process it is said to "drive." Local government
decisions concerning major housing and
redevelopments are necessarily influenced by a vast
complex of competing and conflicting fiscal, political,
environmental, and housing policy considerations,
including numerous federal law requirements. These
types of decisions — as the prevalence of federal,
state, and local impact assessment procedures attest
— both allow for and benefit from careful and
objective evaluation of effects and alternatives.
Experience in fact establishes that the disparate
impact framework furthers important interests of
municipalities and their residents. The same
reasons why the standard is necessary and effective
under other civil rights statutes apply with full, if
not greater, force to housing discrimination. Indeed,
effective enforcement not only provides important
protection to individuals, but it protects
municipalities themselves and all their residents, of
4
all backgrounds, from serious harm. While the
"benefits" to local governments of the rule petitioners
seek are chimerical (it is the rare disparate impact
claim that cannot instead be pleaded as a "disparate
treatment" violation), the latter standard, by
focusing disputes on motives, makes both
decisionmaking and litigation more polarized — and
more intrusive on local self-government — than does
the impact framework's essentially objective inquiry.
Nor does the longstanding interpretation of
Section 804(a) raise genuine constitutional concerns,
let alone the "grave" ones that could authorize a
court to disregard a lawful agency interpretation.
The impact standard does not lead — has not led — to
"racial balancing." What the settled construction
does encourage — advance consideration of a project's
demographic effects (along with many others) and
seeking to avoid actions that unnecessarily effect
and reinforce discrimination, when feasible
alternatives are present — are both lawful and
appropriate.
ARGUMENT
I. Petitioners Present No Valid Reason for
Departing From the Settled Construction of
Section 804(a)
For decades, Section 804(a) has been interpreted
as forbidding both housing practices that
purposefully discriminate on grounds of race,
religion, sex, disability, familial status and national
origin and those which unjustifiably have the effect
of making housing unavailable on those bases. That
construction has been adopted by eleven courts of
appeals; it has been the consistent understanding of
the agency charged with administering and
5
enforcing the Act, across nine presidential
administrations; and it has recently been codified in
carefully-reasoned notice-and-comment regulations
promulgated under congressionally-conferred
rulemaking authority. And as respondents show,
that interpretation is the best, arguably the only
permissible, reading of the statutory text.
Amici write to urge the Court to reject
Petitioners' invitation to invalidate the longstanding
construction based on its predicted effects.
Petitioners' warnings about the dangers the
disparate impact framework poses overlook
important features of its design and are without
support in, and strongly contradicted by, long
experience with Section 804(a)'s operation.
Petitioners' account likewise slights the important
ways that the longstanding interpretation benefits
local governments and the residents, of all
backgrounds, they serve.
A. Long Experience Under Section 804(a)'s
Disparate Impact Framework Contradicts
Petitioners' Predictions
The availability of disparate impact analysis
under Section 804 (a) is settled law in eleven circuits
and has been, for decades. Attempts to summon
objections — and even "constitutional" concerns —
based on actions driven the "specter of disparate-
impact litigation" founder on the fact that "[c]ourts
have recognized claims of this sort for over 30 years,
... and yet there is no indication that the system is
overwhelmed by these types of suits." Lafler u.
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389-90 (2012). As this
Court's recent decisions remind, when a rule "has
been around in the lower courts for 40 years... and
has not given rise to the dire consequences predicted
6
[for it]," Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC., 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012),
such "parade[s] of horribles" must be evaluated in
light of evidence that "none of these things has
happened," Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found.,
Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 614 (2007).
Petitioners exaggerate the risk to government
and private housing providers and developers that
plaintiffs will succeed in bringing or proving prima
facia cases of disparate-impact discrimination
against them, and they ignore the modest showing
that providers and developers must make to rebut a
prima facie claim. What has happened bears no
resemblance to the purported consequences
petitioners argue the Court must act to prevent. By
one careful count, there have been just 92 appellate
decisions addressing the FHA disparate impact
liability standard in the 45 years since the statute's
enactment, many involving private defendants, and
only a small subset have been successful. See Stacy
E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any
Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of
Disparate Impact Claims under the Fair Housing
Act, 63 Am. U. L. Rev. 357, 393 (2013) (finding 18
appellate decisions favorable to plaintiffs since
1968). At the trial court level, there were 593
housing discrimination complaints of any hind filed
in federal courts in 2006, compared, e.g., to 13,042
cases alleging employment discrimination that year.
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, Civil Rights Complaints in U.S. District
Courts, 1990-2006 (2008).
Nor does experience confirm the premise that
lawsuits under the disparate impact standard are
especially costly or time-consuming to defend,
7
relative to disparate treatment suits, or are less
amenable to rapid disposition. Indeed, in practice,
claims are almost invariably brought under both
theories, as this one was, and rarely on the disparate
impact theory alone. See, e.g., Dehoyos u. Allstate
Corp., 345 F.3d 290, 299 n.7 (5th Cir.2003) ("We ...
decline to differentiate claims of disparate impact
and claims of intentional discrimination at this
preliminary stage of litigation").
In circuits where the disparate impact
framework is settled law, large numbers of such
claims are dismissed prior to trial, commonly based
on plaintiffs' failure to make the rigorous showing
needed for a prima facie case. See, e.g., White Oak
Property Deut., LLC u. Washington Township, 606
F.3d 842, 851 (6th Cir. 2010); Reinhart u. Lincoln
County, 482 F.3d 1225, 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2007);
Seicshnaydre, 63 Am. L. Rev. Appendix A (collecting
cases). Compare, e.g., Hunt u. Cromartie, 526 U.S.
541, 546 (1999) (holding summary judgment
inappropriate on intentional discrimination claim,
explaining that "[t]he task of assessing a
jurisdiction's motivation, however, is not a simple
matter; on the contrary, it is an inherently complex
endeavor, one requiring the trial court to perform a
`sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available."') (quoting
Vill. of Arlington Heights u. Metro Hous. Deu. Co.,
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). Even once the plaintiff
successfully makes a prima facia case, all that
Section 804(a)'s disparate impact standard requires
is an inquiry into the availability of alternative
means of pursuing the defendants' objectives that
would not yield results that are the "functional[]
equivalent" of purposeful discrimination. Watson u.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988).
8
In practice, there may be many legitimate reasons
for siting low-income housing tax credits in minority
communities — reasons such as community demand,
existing blighted housing stock, or favorable cost
structures. There is little harm in careful
consideration of these reasons and whether
alternative measures would serve them just as well.
Where a defendant cannot come forward with
evidence that there are no alternatives that would
satisfy its legitimate objectives, then a plaintiff will
prevail. But such cases are rare, and the bar for
demonstrating a legitimate purpose is not high. See,
e.g., Green u. Sunpointe Associates, Ltd. (W.D.
Wash., May 12, 1997, C96-1542C) 1997 WL 1526484,
at *7 (desire to save administrative costs by not
accepting Section 8 housing vouchers "could well be
a legitimate business necessity sufficient").
In many jurisdictions, the obligation to identify
potential adverse impacts on minorities and consider
alternatives will remain regardless of whether the
FHA recognizes disparate impact liability. Many
states and localities have incorporated the disparate
impact analysis into their own fair housing laws.
See Sisemore u. Master Fin., Inc., 151 Cal. App. 4th
1386, 1419 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that state Fair
Employment and Housing Act "plainly authorizes a
claim for housing discrimination irrespective of
intent, where the alleged act or omission has the
effect of discriminating"); Keith u. Volpe, 858 F.2d
467, 485 (9th Cir. 1988) (same under Cal. Gov't Code
§ 65008(b)); Citizens In Action u. Twp. Of Mt. Holly,
2007 WL 1930457 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 5,
2007) (recognizing that under state law "a plaintiff
may prevail on a racial discrimination housing claim
9
on evidence of discriminatory impact alone," but
holding impact claims unripe); N.Y.C. Hum. Rights
Law § 8-107(17) (providing cause of action for "an
unlawful discriminatory practice based upon
disparate impact"); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n u.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2012 WL 1288489 (N.D.
Ohio Apr. 16, 2012) (`Ohio courts have established
that [disparate impact] is applicable in the context of
housing discrimination"); Sunderland Family
Treatment Serus. v. City of Pasco, 26 P.3d 955, 961
(Ct. App. 2001) (holding that Washington Housing
Policy Act "has no intent requirement").
And, as is explained infra, local planners and
housing officials charged with approving and siting
development projects, as a matter of policy and
sound practice, take into account demographic
effects (and seek to avoid unjustifiable, disparate
impacts).
Given the modesty of the "threat" of Section
804(a) disparate impact litigation and the existence
of these independent, overlapping obligations, it is
simply implausible that a decision upholding this
settled construction will have far-reaching effects, as
Petitioners contend, Br. 47, or that it will expose
public and private housing providers to credible
disparate impact allegations from their routine
housing policy decisions or cause them to shelve
worthy housing projects, as Petitioners' amici would
have it, see, e.g., Br. of Tex. Apart. Ass'n 20; Br. of
Houston Hous. Auth. at 8-10.
B. Best Practices in Housing Development Involve
Consideration of a Wide Range of Alternatives,
Including Unintended Segregative Effects
10
Attorneys, planners, and housing officials in
amici and other municipalities can readily attest
that the risk of liability — or litigation — under
Section 804(a) for unjustifiable disparate impact
ranks well down the very long list of considerations
that influence housing and development
decisionmaking.
1. While Petitioners raise a concern about
widespread "racial balancing" to comply with Section
804(a), Br. 44, government decisions about siting
affordable housing projects are in reality influenced
by a wide array of complex, inevitably cross-cutting
fiscal, political, legal, environmental, and policy
considerations. State and local governments
deciding whether, how, and where to undertake a
redevelopment project must determine which
populations the project should serve; whether to
construct a new building or rehabilitate an existing
structure; and whether to build at high or lower
density, for instance. Such choices invariably
implicate differences as to governing philosophy,
municipal priorities, and views of wise housing
policy (and are influenced, as well, by the nature and
availability of funding sources and the array of
political forces supportive of or opposed to a
particular choice).
Such planning decisions also and necessarily
take into account existing neighborhood
characteristics and land uses, local and long-term
economic and demographic trends, land acquisition
and construction costs, site characteristics —
including natural disaster risks and environmental
remediation needs; traffic volume and safety; access
to public transportation; the adequacy of utilities
11
and public services and proximity of parks, schools,
and health care facilities.
These lengthy but incomplete lists highlight a
further important reality: that decisionmaking
relating to large-scale projects (and many smaller
ones) almost always does — and as a matter of sound
practice, should — entail rigorous evaluation of these
many considerations both for the action
contemplated and for available alternatives.
Such assessments are performed pursuant to
state and local planning and environmental review
laws, which articulate objectives and priorities, see,
e.g., Cal. Gov. Code § 65300 (requiring city and
county general plans); id. § 65302 (specifying
mandatory subjects), and provide for, as California's
Environmental Quality Act does, a comprehensive,
"systematic" evaluation of a broad array of project
impacts, Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21002, often directing
that public agencies reject or modify proposed
projects "if there are feasible alternatives or feasible
mitigation measures available." Id. See also CEQA
Guideline 15093 (detailing requirements for written
"statement of overriding reasons").
Indeed, HUD regulations likewise provide (for all
but the smallest federally-supported housing and
development projects) that local governments
perform environmental assessments, which must,
among other things, "determine existing conditions
and describe the character, features and resources of
the project area and its surroundings"; identify and
analyze "all potential environmental impacts,
whether beneficial or adverse"; "[e]xamine and
recommend feasible ways in which the project ...
could be modified [and] alternatives to the project."
24 C.F.R. § 58.40. See id. § 58.42 (requiring full
12
Environmental Impact Statements for projects with
potentially significant effects); cf. Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 408 (1970)
(interpreting statutory provision prohibiting
highway construction in local public park without
federal agency determination of "no feasible and
prudent alternative routes or ... design changes ...to
reduce the harm").
The character of these local, federal, state and
local processes reinforces that the governmental
action Section 804(a) in fact encourages — careful,
serious examination of effects and justifications for
proposed actions, in light of the availability of
feasible alternatives and mitigations — is
particularly appropriate and nonintrusive.
II. There Would Be Significant Costs to
Jettisoning Disparate Impact as a Tool for
Enforcing the FHA
A. The Impact Standard Avoids Intrusive
Inquiries into Government Motive and
Needless Polarization
"[T]he line between discriminatory purpose and
discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright" as
some arguments against the latter presume.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 254 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring). Although it is a truism
that "impact alone" does not establish intentional
discrimination — nor disparate impact liability, for
that matter, see Langlois v. Abington Housing Auth.,
207 F.3d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2000) — evidence of
disproportionate burden will typically "provide [the]
... starting point" of the disparate treatment
analysis, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
13
Housing Deu. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). And
while there are significant differences between the
"the factual issues that typically dominate in
disparate impact cases," Watson, 487 U.S. at 987,
both frameworks train on practices that offend the
law's core antidiscrimination mandate. See In re
Alabama Employment Discrimination Litigation,
198 F. 3d 1305, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (If "after a
prima facie demonstration of discriminatory impact,
the employer cannot demonstrate that the
challenged practice is a job related business
necessity, what explanation can there be for the
employer's use of the discriminatory practice?")
The central difference between the two modes of
proof is that the impact standard directs the parties'
and courts' attention toward objective aspects of a
disputed action and its alternatives, while the
disparate treatment inquiry focuses on the sincerity
of policymakers' (and, in certain cases, citizen
advocates) explanations of their motives for favoring
their chosen course. Were it not for the disparate-
treatment standard, arguments about the impacts of
housing policy on minority communities would focus
entirely on the latter standard.
But inquiries into subjective motivations and
decisionmakers' sincerity raise grave conceptual and
adjudicative difficulties. See Edwards u. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 638 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing motive inquiry as "almost always an
impossible task"). Accord Esperanza Peace and
Justice Or. u. City of San Antonio, 316 F. Supp. 2d
433, 453 (W.D. Tex. 2001) ("It [is] ...an exceedingly
difficult and perilous enterprise to establish the
intent of a lone legislator. And when the legislative
body consists of numerous legislators, each with his
14
or her own myriad and conflicting motivations, the
plaintiffs burden is multiplied, if not impossible").
For example, the court in United States v. City of
Birmingham, 538 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Mich. 1982),
undertook to determine whether intentional
discrimination had been established by proof that
"[r]acial concerns were a motivating factor behind
the opposition of at least two of the four members of
the majority faction" that had defeated a housing
development, id. at 829, and it ultimately imposed
liability based on a finding that "[r]egardless of their
personal views, all four members felt bound by the
results of [a referendum and] were aware that a
significant number of [referendum voters had been]
... motivated in part by a desire to exclude black
people from the City." Id. Aff'd as modified, 727
F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1984).1
As Arlington Heights itself recognized, "[j]udicial
inquiries into legislative or executive motivation
represent a substantial intrusion," 429 U.S. at 268,
and the intent standard allows those alleging
discrimination to seek discovery and testimony from
government officials as to their purposes. Id. See,
e.g., Scott-Harris, 134 F.3d at 439 (rejecting
municipal liability because "the motivations of
[most] council members ... did not receive
individualized scrutiny," and highlighting, as basis
for that ruling, plaintiffs failure to "depose[] any of
the seven [council members] []or call[] them as
witnesses at trial"), rev'd on other grounds, 523 U.S.
44. See also City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye
Community Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 196 (2003)
(affirming that "statements made by private
15
individuals in the course of a citizen-driven petition
drive [are] sometimes relevant to equal protection
analysis") (citing Washington u. Seattle School Dist.
No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 471 (1982)).
Finally, accusations of bigotry and litigation over
motives are invariably divisive and polarizing.
Unlike a disparate impact case, where those
challenging government action can proceed, without
impugning the good faith and sincerity of individual
officials, to contest the gravity of the impact or the
feasibility of identified alternatives, °[i]t is a most
serious charge to say a State [or local government
official] has engaged in a pattern or practice
designed to deny its citizens the equal protection of
the laws." Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). See Dennis J. Hutchinson,
Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmahing in
the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 Geo. L. J. 1, 42
(1979) (quoting Chief Justice Warren's memo to the
Conference that opinions in Brown u. Board of
Education "should be short, readable by the lay
public, non-rhetorical, unemotional, and, above all,
non-accusatory").
Indeed, this focus on objective facts relating to
impacts and available alternatives promotes more
constructive and substantive decisionmaking for the
vastly larger number of instances that never reach a
courthouse. See e.g., Ricci u. DeStefano, 557 U.S.
557, 585 (2009) (noting that when employer solicits
input "during the [civil service] test-design stage ...
to ensure the test is fair, that process can provide a
common ground for open discussions"). Those
affected by proposed government actions can seek to
work with decisionmakers without weakening claims
of invidious intent; officials have reason to consider
16
and respond to alternative submissions on their
merits, including by modifying plans based on
meritorious ones. And even when plans proceed
unmodified, the public and affected citizens receive
some assurance that their interests and concerns
received consideration. Cf. Weinberger u. Catholic
Action, 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981) (through NEPA's
requirement of EIS publication, "the public is made
aware that the agency has taken environmental
considerations into account").
B. The Disparate Impact Standard Performs a
Distinct and Important Role in Combatting
Discrimination, One That Benefits
Municipalities and All Their Residents
Petitioners' brief wholly ignores the principal
reasons, many canvassed in opinions of this Court,
why Congress, HUD, and state and local
governments have adopted the disparate impact
framework as part of their fair housing laws.
First, the standard can provide proper redress in
cases where purposeful disparate treatment is
present, but difficult to detect and prove, getting at
"[discrimination [that] could actually exist under
the guise of compliance with [Title VII]." Griggs u.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 435 (1971) (citation
omitted). Cf. Alabama Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 198 F. 3d at 1322 (`what [other]
explanation can there be...?" for adherence to a
practice shown to produce large disparities once
equally effective, nondiscriminatory alternatives
have been established).
Moreover, discriminatory effects standards push
against actions that perpetuate and aggravate the
present effects of prior purposeful discrimination,
17
reaching practices that "operate to `freeze' the status
quo of prior discriminat[ion]." Griggs, 401 U.S. at
430 (1971); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. u.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973) (impact rules ensure
that earlier discrimination does not "work a
cumulative and invidious burden on [minority]
citizens for the remainder of their lives"). And the
standard, by promoting objective analysis of
alternatives, can prevent discrimination that would
otherwise result from unexamined assumptions or
unconscious prejudices. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 990-
91 ("[E]ven if one assumed that [discrimination
through subjective employment criteria] can be
adequately policed through disparate treatment
analysis, the problem of subconscious stereotypes
and prejudices would remain"); Connecticut u. Teal,
457 U.S. 440, 449 (1982) (describing disparate
impact as serving a "prophylactic" role).
The need for such measures continues. Rigorous
studies confirm that present-day intentional housing
discrimination is remarkably pervasive, see, e.g.,
Natl. Comm'n on Fair Housing and Equal
Opportunity, The Future of Fair Housing 13 (2008)
(finding more than four million instances of housing
discrimination annually); and much of it involves
practices — such as steering minority homebuyers to
"minority" neighborhoods or failing to offer prime
mortgage terms to those who qualify — that are
surely not "eas[y] to identify and prosecute." Br. 28.
Moreover, as the framers of the FHA understood,
market forces cannot always be relied upon to
correct intentionally discriminatory practices. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (anti-blockbusting provision,
making unlawful "[f]or profit, to induce or attempt to
induce any person to sell or rent any dwelling by
18
representations regarding the entry or prospective
entry into the neighborhood of a person or persons of
a particular race"); accord Garza u. Cnty. of Los
Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 778 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Kozinski, J., concurring in part). Compare Br.
Amicus Curiae American Ins. Ass'n at 15 (arguing
that "market-driven incentive[s]" "ensure" that
insurance rates are nondiscriminatory) (quotation
marks omitted).
Equally important, present residential
demographic patterns are, to a great degree, the
direct result of purposefully discriminatory acts,
perpetrated on a vast scale, decades ago by the
federal government, states, localities, and private
actors. See Fair Housing Act of 1967, Hearings
Before Subcomm. Housing & Urban Affairs, S.
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. (1967)
at 8 (Department of Justice's acknowledgment of the
"peculiarly enduring character" of "evil" done by
Federal Housing Administration's discriminatory
lending rules: "Thousands of racially segregated
neighborhoods were built, millions of people re-
assorted on the basis of race, color, or class, the
differences built in, in neighborhoods from coast to
coast"). Cf. Smith u. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228,
258-59 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
(objecting to decision upholding impact liability
under the ADEA, noting that "no one would argue
that older workers have suffered disadvantages as a
result of entrenched historical patterns of
discrimination"). Present-day housing and
development decisions will have similarly enduring
effects; and, as scholars and courts have found,
policies affecting where a person resides — and where
housing has been made unavailable to him — have
far-reaching effects on educational and employment
19
opportunity, health and safety, and the ability to
accumulate wealth. See 43 Pa. Stat. § 952
(legislative finding that discrimination in housing
11result[s] in racial segregation in public schools and
other community facilities"); see generally XAVIER DE
SOUZA BRIGGS, ED., THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY
7, 8 (2005); Margery Austin Turner and Lynette A.
Rawlings, Promoting Neighborhood Diversity (Urban
Inst. 2009) (`Decades of scholarly research have
documented [how] ... the persistence of segregation
sustains racial and ethnic inequality in the United
States and undermines prospects for long-term
prosperity").
As the Seventh Circuit reasoned in its decision
finding disparate impact liability on remand in
Arlington Heights, the impact standard properly
captures that Congress did not enact the
Section 804(a) remedy as punishment for actors with
retrograde attitudes, but rather to open up housing
opportunities where exclusion long prevailed. See
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1292-93 (7th Cir.
1977) ("If the effect of a zoning scheme is to
perpetuate segregated housing, neither common
sense nor the rationale of the Fair Housing Act
dictates that the preclusion of minorities in advance
should be favored over the preclusion of minorities in
reaction to a plan which would create integration.").
Perhaps most important, the benefits the Fair
Housing Act generally — and the longstanding
interpretation of Section 804(a) — seek to secure are
not limited to members of groups that historically
have been subject to disadvantage. As the framers
of the Act believed, Americans of every background
benefit from open housing patterns. See, e.g.,
20
Trafficante u. Met. Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972)
(upholding FHA standing based on white residents'
allegations they "had lost the social benefits of living
in an integrated community [and] had missed
business and professional advantages").
Moreover, as many state and local governments
have recognized, these harms are not solely
individual: "Discrimination threatens not only the
rights and privileges of [a State's] inhabitants ... .
but menaces the institutions and foundations of a
free democratic State." N.J. Stat. 10:5-3. In concrete
terms, "[h]igh levels of segregation [have been found
to] ... constrain the vitality and economic
performance of metropolitan regions," Turner and
Rawlings, supra, at 3 (citing sources). Indeed,
experience in the recent economic crisis provided a
potent, unsettling reminder of the distinct municipal
injuries that unaddressed housing discrimination
can wreak. The wave of foreclosures that resulted
from discriminatory landing practices directed at
residents of minority communities in many
municipalities injured not only the homeowners
targeted and their immediate neighborhoods, but
entire cities, their local governments, residents, and
taxpayers — who incurred a wide array of fiscal,
economic and civic harms, comparable in scope to
those wrought by massive natural disasters. See
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore u. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 2011 WL 1557759 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 20 11)
(allowing Fair Housing Act suit brought for
municipal injuries to proceed).
Conclusion
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.
21
Respectfully submitted,
22